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LOREN F. SELZNICK* AND C AROLYN LA MACCHIA *

Cybersecurity Liability: How Technically Savvy Can
We Expect Small Business Owners to Be?

INTRODUCTION

“Target Data Breach Spilled Info on As Many As 70 Million Customers.”1 “Home
Depot’s breach could be as big as Target’s.”2 Data breaches at the nation’s largest
retail companies dominate the news, but small businesses are at greater risk.3 Hackers
recognize that small businesses have neither the financial resources nor the technical
expertise to protect their data.4 Cyberattacks on small businesses intensify, but the
law’s cybersecurity liability model develops with only the largest corporations in
mind.5
When the public learns of data breaches at the megastores, its reaction is
outrage.6 State regulators are inclined to punish the corporation.7 How could the
corporation have been so careless with customer information? The hacker behind the
breach is presumed to be untraceable and, in any event, too poor to pay for all the
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1. Maggie McGrath, Target Data Breach Spilled Info on as Many as 70 Million Customers, FORBES (Jan.
10, 2014, 8:56 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2014/01/10/target-data-breach-spilled-infoon-as-many-as-70-million-customers/#4b03288be795.
2. Jaikumar Vijayan, Home Depot Breach Could be as Big as Target's, COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 2, 2014,
1:13 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2600309/data-security-home-depot-breach-couldpotentially-be-as-large-as-targets.html.
3. Jane Chen, Cyber Security: Bull’s-Eye on Small Businesses, 16 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 97, 97–100 (2016).
4. Id. at 100.
5. See id. at 108 (noting that current cyber-security regulations do not discuss the requirements of small
businesses prior to a breach).
6. Lauren Zumbach, Massive Equifax Data Breach Prompts Outrage, Investigations, Bills to Ban Credit
Freeze Fees, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 16, 2017, 5:32 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-equifax-databreach-0917-biz-20170915-story.html.
7. Id.; see infra notes 199–206.
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CYBERSECURITY LIABILITY
consumer harm.8 The corporate victim of the breach is blamed for failing to adopt
reasonable cybersecurity measures.9 Customers with compromised data bring class
action lawsuits and regulators seek fines.10 Some courts have been reluctant to impose
liability on the corporate victim of a third-party hacker, but a growing number have
allowed claims on a variety of theories.11
This legal trajectory poses a threat to small businesses.12 Small businesses face
the same risk of data breach as their larger counterparts but lack the resources for
cybersecurity measures.13 A cyberattack, followed by customer suits and state fines,
could mean the end of a small business unfairly held to an impossible standard of
cybersecurity.14
This interdisciplinary article describes the unique cyber dangers to small
businesses. It then surveys the emerging law of data breach liability—the variety of
liability and damage theories customers have asserted around the country and the
potential for lawsuits and fines under state data breach notification laws. Next, the
article considers whether the potential liability of a small business for a third-party
hacker data breach is unacceptably high. Finally, an alternative market-driven
statutory approach is suggested to protect small businesses.
I. THE RISKS TO SMALL BUSINESSES

Cyberattacks are surging and smaller businesses are likely to be targeted.15 Because
of their limited resources and technological skills, small businesses are easy prey for
hackers.16 Large corporations employ teams of information technology personnel, an

8. Justin C. Pierce, Shifting Data Breach Liability: A Congressional Approach, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 975,
990 (2016).
9. Id. at 990–91.
10. Id. at 54; Charlotte A. Tschider, Experimenting with Privacy: Driving Efficiency Through a StateInformed Federal Data Breach Notification and Data Protection Law, 18 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 45, 51
(2015).
11. Compare Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (dismissing a claim against a payroll
processing firm for damages caused by a breach for lack of Article III standing), with In re Target Corp.
Customer Data Security Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1159 (D. Minn. 2014) (holding that plaintiffs did
have standing based on collateral consequences from the breach).
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See infra Part I.
14. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant at 7, LabMD, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, No. 16-16270, 2014 WL
2994344 (11th Cir. Dec. 27, 2016) (citing the severe costs of compliance with an FTC investigation and
litigation to the business of a small medical laboratory).
15. See Chen, supra note 3, at 100.
16. See id.
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impossibility for small businesses.17 The larger businesses also mount multi-faceted
defenses against data breaches, which smaller businesses cannot do.18
A. Data Breach Targets
The number and severity of cyber security attacks increase each year.19 About 80
percent of executives and security experts surveyed reported a security breach in
their organizations within the past year.20 Since many incidents go undetected, this
figure is undoubtedly understated.21 Cyber-attacks are “becoming progressively
destructive and target a broadening array of information and attack vectors.”22 All
business, both large and small, are targeted.23
In 2016, reported data breaches increased by 40 percent over 2015.24 Yahoo
announced the largest data breach in history affecting more than one billion
accounts.25 2017 was also an active year.26 Examples of major breaches using a variety
of techniques can be found in business, academia, health care, and governments
around the world.27 Cyber criminals stole approximately $54.5 million from FACC,
an Austrian-based aerospace parts manufacturer (with clients like Airbus and

17. Chris Morris, 14 Million US Businesses are at Risk of a Hacker Threat, CNBC (July 25, 2017, 10:02
AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/25/14-million-us-businesses-are-at-risk-of-a-hacker-threat.html.
18. Taylor Armerding, Why Criminals Pick on Small Business, CSO (Jan. 12, 2015, 4:04 AM),
https://www.csoonline.com/article/2866911/cyber-attacks-espionage/why-criminals-pick-on-smallbusiness.html.
19. Herb Weisbaum, Data Breaches Happening at Record Pace, Report Finds, NBC NEWS (July 24, 2017,
10:18 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/consumer/data-breaches-happening-record-pace-report-findsn785881; PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, US CYBERSECURITY: PROGRESS STALLED KEY FINDINGS FROM THE 2015
US STATE OF CYBERCRIME SURVEY 3 (2015), https://www.pwc. com/us/en/increasing-it-effectiveness/
publications/assets/2015-us-cybercrime-survey.pdf.
20. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 19, at 3.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Sam Thielman, Yahoo Hack: 1bn Accounts Compromised by Biggest Data Breach in History,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2016, 7:23 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/ 14/yahoo-hacksecurity-of-one-billion-accounts-breached.
24. Olga Kharif, 2016 Was a Record Year for Data Breaches, BLOOMBERG TECH. (Jan 19, 2017, 7:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-19/data-breaches-hit-record-in-2016-as-dnc-wendy-s-cohacked.
25. Thielman, supra note 23.
26. Abigail Summerville, Protect Against the Fastest-Growing Crime: Cyber Attacks, CNBC (July 25, 2017,
1:12 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/25/stay-protected-from-the-uss-fastest-growing-crime-cyberattacks.html.
27. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 19, at 5.
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Boeing).28 Chipotle reported unauthorized network activity on its in-restaurant
payment processor impacting several weeks of payment card transactions.29
Information including Social Security numbers belonging to over 150,000 current
and former students, faculty, and staff was stolen from the University of Central
Florida30 and the University of California, Berkeley.31 Newkirk Products, Inc., a
service provider that issues healthcare identification cards, announced a data
breach that affected up to 3.3 million people.32 Unidentified hackers were able to gain
access to a server that contained sensitive member information, including names,
mailing addresses, dates of birth, and details about health insurance plans.33 Hackers
angry about U.S. foreign policy called attention to their cause by breaching the U.S.
Department of Justice’s database and releasing data on 10,000 Department of
Homeland Security employees one day and then releasing data on 20,000 FBI
employees the next day.34
Large companies are responding to these threats; the cybersecurity industry
collects approximately $75 billion annually.35 Recent studies indicate, however, that
hackers indiscriminately choose their victims36 and small businesses have become
frequent targets.37 Over the last ﬁve years, attacks on businesses with 250 or fewer
employees has increased.38 As of mid-2016, one study reported that 43 percent of

28. Graham Cluley, Hackers Steal $55 million From Boeing Supplier, TRIPWIRE (Jan. 21, 2016),
https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/boeing-supplier-hacked-claims-55million-worth-of-damage-as-stock-price-falls/.
29. Whitney Filloon & Brenna Houck, Massive Chipotle Data Breach Affected Roughly 2,250 Restaurants,
EATER (May 30, 2017), https://www.eater.com/2017/4/26/15433866/chipotle-data-breach-credit-cards.
30. Elizabeth Weise, Data breach hits 63,000 U. of Central Florida Students, Staff, USA TODAY (Feb. 4,
2016, 11:17 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/02/04/data-beach-63000-university-offlorida-students-staff/79813904/.
31. Janet Gilmore, Campus alerting 80,000 individuals to cyberattack, BERKELEY NEWS (Feb. 26, 2016),
http://news.berkeley.edu/2016/02/26/campus-alerting-80000-individuals-to-cyberattack/.
32. Robert Abel, Newkirk Medical Records Breach Impacts 3.3M, Blue Cross Blue Shield Customers Affected,
SC MEDIA US (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.scmagazine.com/unauthorized-individual-gains-access-to-a-servercontaining-data-on-33m/article/528104/.
33. Id.
34. Mary Kay Mallonee, Hackers Publish Contact Info of 20,000 FBI Employees, CNN (Feb. 8, 2016, 8:34
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/08/politics/hackers-fbi-employee-info/.
35. Steve Morgan, Cybersecurity Market Reaches $75 Billion in 2015, Expected to Reach $170 Billion By
2020, FORBES (Dec. 20, 2015, 3:01 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevemorgan/2015/12/20/cybersecurity%
E2%80%8B-%E2%80%8Bmarket-reaches-75-billion-in-2015%E2%80%8B%E2 %80% 8B-%E2%80%8Bexpected
-to-reach-170-billion-by-2020/#48e3724330d6.
36. SYMANTEC, INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT 44 (2016), https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/
symantec/docs/reports/istr-21-2016-en.pdf.
37. Id. at 43.
38. Id. at 42.
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cyber-attacks targeted small businesses.39 Research on the cybersecurity in small and
medium-sized businesses revealed that no business is small enough to evade a
cyberattack or data breach.40 Unfortunately, a smaller organization may not have the
budget and in-house expertise to determine the cause of a breach and harden its
systems and networks against potential threats.41 All businesses, regardless of size,
are faced with the growing probability of a breach by criminals who use more creative
and complicated techniques.42 However, larger businesses are better equipped to
mitigate the risk and recover from a breach.43
B. Vulnerabilities of Small Business Data
Although most of the cyber breaches that make the headlines are from large
companies, the breaches of smaller companies are far greater in number.44 Small
companies also hold valuable customer information.45 Hackers regard the data
systems at small businesses as “low-hanging fruit.”46
Most cybercriminals seek personally identifiable information (“PII”) for
financial gain.47 PII is any data that distinguishes one individual from another which,
when disclosed, can result in harm to the individual whose privacy has been
breached.48 Surprising to some, medical PII is a key to a very profitable door that is

39. Joshua Sophy, 43 Percent of Cyber Attacks Target Small Business. Technology Trends. SMALL BUS.
TRENDS (Apr. 28, 2016), https://smallbiztrends.com/2016/04/cyber-attacks-target-small-business. html.
40. See PONEMON INST. LLC, 2016 STATE OF CYBERSECURITY IN SMALL & MEDIUM-SIZED BUSINESSES (SMB)
(2016), http://www.triscal.com.br/shared/docs/seguranca-state_cybersecurity_ small_medium_ businesses2016.pdf.
41. Id.
42. Paul Gordon, Rise of The Cyber Criminals, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 25, 2016, 7:50AM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/rise-of-the-cyber-criminals_us_57bed90ae4b06384eb3e60b9.
43. Disha Pandit, Intricacies Involved with Cyber–Insurance, CYBER SECURITY COMMUNITY (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://securitycommunity.tcs.com/infosecsoapbox/articles/2017/11/02/intricacies-involved-cyber-insurance.
44. Rosalie L. Donlon, Small, Mid-Sized Businesses Hit by 62% of All Cyber Attacks, PROP. CASUALTY 360O
(May 27, 2015, 5:20 AM), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2015/05/27/small-mid-sized-businesses-hit-by62-of-all-cyber?slreturn=1496753378.
45. Joseph Steinberg, Small Businesses Beware: Half of all Cyber-Attacks Target You, INC. (Mar. 21, 2017),
https://www.inc.com/joseph-steinberg/small-businesses-beware-half-of-all-cyber-attacks-target-you.html.
46. Julie Knudson, Small Business Security Trends You Need to Know, SMALL BUS. COMPUTING (Feb. 23,
2016), https://www.smallbusinesscomputing.com/News/Security/small-business-security-trends-you-need-toknow.html.
47. Robert E. Holdfreter, Cyber Criminals Step Up Their Games to Harvest PII, FRAUD MAG. (Mar.-Apr.
2014), http://www.fraud-magazine.com/article.aspx?id=4294982013.
48. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-122, GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE
CONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII) (2010), at ES-1.
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worth much more to cyber criminals than banking PII.49 Health records give
cybercriminals information not just for fake medical claims but also for acquiring
credit card accounts and mortgages.50
Despite good intentions, a doctor’s office can be easy prey.51 Through
continuing education, board-certified physicians are well-informed about medical
protocol, insurance coverage, and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).52 Apart from privacy concerns, which are beyond the
scope of this article, medical and banking PII, desirable to hackers for financial gain,
can be vulnerable in a small physician’s office as the following example shows.
The physician shares the importance of protecting patient information with the
small staff of nurses and office workers. Although the staff members know how to
use computers, no one is formally educated in information technology or
cybersecurity management. The practice has purchased licenses to access, through
the Internet, a patient management system that interfaces with the major health
insurance carriers. All programs and data are managed by the application service
provider for the patient management system. At the direction of the application
service provider, the physician’s office connects to the patient management system
via the Internet. All data is encrypted using the very secure asymmetrickey encryption method and includes digital signatures.53 There is a computer in each
examination room and each office cubicle. Each computer has a wireless Wi-Fi
connection to the office router, which saves the cost of wiring and provides for
flexibility in configuring the workspace. The office router provides each computer
with a wireless connection to the Internet and the shared office printer through a
password-protected, encrypted connection. The reception area includes a bankprovided credit card chip reader for processing examination fees.
Even though a cyber security audit of this business’s technology infrastructure
would be favorable, there are multiple risks of a breach. Exposure begins when a new

49. Justin Bonnema, Why Cybercriminals Are After Your Identity, SECURITY AWARENESS COMPANY (Nov.
9th, 2016), https://www.thesecurityawarenesscompany.com/2016/11/09/why-cybercriminals-are-after-youridentity/.
50. Id.
51. Dan Munro, Data Breaches in Healthcare Totaled Over 112 Million Records in 2015, FORBES (Dec. 31,
2015, 9:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danmunro/2015/12/31/data-breaches-in-healthcare-total-over112-million-records-in-2015/#74b9af4d7b07.
52. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act is designed to protect the privacy of health
care information. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY, SUMMARY OF
HIPAA SECURITY RULE (2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.
html.
53. The asymmetric-key encryption method that includes digital signatures is considered a preferred
method for secure digital transmission of data. Margaret Rouse, Asymmetric Cryptography (public key
cryptography), TECHTARGET (June 2016), http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/ asymmetriccryptography.

222

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Cybersecurity Liability_page_proofs (Do Not Delete)

5/3/2018 4:29 PM

LOREN F. SELZNICK & CAROLYN LAMACCHIA
patient first visits the practice. This patient completes a set of forms that require
personal information such as social security number, credit card numbers, driver’s
license information, contact details, health insurance information, personal and
family medical history, and employment information. The physician refers to the
paper document during the initial examination. After the visit, an office worker keys
the patient’s information into the patient management system. The original papers
are scanned, saved electronically in an encrypted format, and then shredded. All
seems safe.
What if the office is busy with pressing patient needs? Keying new patient data
into the patient management system is not considered a priority task since the patient
has already been examined. New patient forms are kept in a neat pile on the office
worker’s desk awaiting processing. Anyone with physical access to the forms-another staff member, a delivery person, or another patient--can take one or more
forms and have access to the PII. An office worker could take the forms to lunch or
home to ‘catch up’ on work. The office worker keys in patient information while
eating lunch in an open-access network café. Also in the café is a hacker
eavesdropping through a man-in-the-middle attack on café customers.54 The hacker
mechanically records all data entered by the officer worker in addition to all of the
lunch transactions. The hacker sips coffee and blends into the customer base as a
device surreptitiously collects information.
The doctor’s office computers connect to the Internet through a passwordenabled Wi-Fi router. The password was initially established as the office phone
number and never changed. This password is convenient because it is easy to
remember. The staff is not aware of the steps to change the password. As a result, all
computers in the office connect to the Wi-Fi with the same password. Sometimes the
waiting room fills with anxious patients who bring their smart phones and tablets to
pass the time. The patients see the staff using the office Wi-Fi and ask for the
password. The receptionist knows most, if not all, the patients and sees no harm in
sharing the Wi-Fi password. Unwittingly, a patient may provide a point of entry to
the physician’s computer network through his or her compromised device. Over
time, the router’s password becomes meaningless protection. Wi-Fi access provides
an entry into the local network, the patient management system, and credit card
payment system.
Finally, a group of cyber criminals generates an impressive impersonation of an
email from an insurance company. The company logo and contact name is digitally
copied from the insurance company website. A list of small physician practices and
contact information is gathered from a physician listing website. The cyber criminals
54. A man-in-the-middle (“MITM”) attack is a form of eavesdropping where communication between two
devices is monitored by an unauthorized party. The purpose of the interception can be to modify then resend
the message, or just gather information from the message. Man-in-the-Middle Attack (MITM), TECHNOPEDIA,
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/4018/man-in-the-middle-attack-mitm (last visited Feb. 8, 2018).
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create a phishing cyber-attack by mechanically issuing emails to the small physician
practices that look as though they are generated from an insurance company. The
emails direct the office managers to apply for the new payment system. The link in
the email is very convincing because it displays the actual web address of the
insurance company. Clicking on the link brings the user to the cyber criminals’
website. The office worker is not suspicious because the site requests publicly
available information about the physician’s office. But, the site also installs keylogging software that records all activities made on the office worker’s computer. This
places all financial and PII of the practice in jeopardy. Reports of security breaches
show that most do not result from clever attackers discovering new kinds of flaws,
but rather from repeated tries of well-known hacks.55 There are many avenues for
attack at this physician’s office. The physician and the employees can access the
application service provider to record patient records at home. Their devices at home
may not have been updated with the latest operating system security fixes. Typically,
there is a flood of breaches following the announcement of an operating system fix
since many users do not regularly apply updates. The employee’s home network may
not be secure, so anyone can mechanically eavesdrop on digital activity. Employees
may be using their own devices filled with applications from unknown developers.
The applications may seem interesting to use but contain trap doors for collecting
data. The patients’ PII is only as secure as the weakest link in this chain of activities.
C. Preparedness Comparison—Large and Small Businesses
Why is it easier to hack a small business? There is a vast difference in the
cybersecurity management of large and small businesses specifically in managerial
perception, employee expertise, regulatory compliance, and technology
infrastructure.56 Small businesses often believe they are safe from cyberattacks
because of a perception that they don’t have anything worth stealing.57 However,
small businesses have information valuable to cybercriminals including employee
and customer PII and intellectual property.58 In addition, small businesses provide
access to larger networks such as supply chains.59 Given their role in the nation’s

55.

David Bisson, Takeaways from the 2016 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report, TRIPWIRE: STATE

OF SECURITY (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cyber-

security/takeaways-from-the-2016-verizon-data-breach-investigations-report/David Bisson.
56. JUHEE KWON & M. ERIC JOHNSON, Healthcare Security Strategies for Regulatory Compliance and Data
Security, 30 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 41 (2013).
57. SYMANTEC, supra note 36, at 36.
58. Michael Kemps & Kimberly Pease, “Information Security: The Human Factor” LAW J. NEWSL. (Apr.
2017), http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/2017/04/01/ information-securitythe-human-factor/.
59. Daniel Clapper & William Richmond, Small Business Compliance with PCI DSS, 19.1 J. MGMT. INFO. &
DECISION SCI. 54, 56 (2016).
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supply chain and economy and their limited resources to secure their information,
systems, and networks, small businesses are attractive targets for cybercriminals.60
Large businesses hire information security analysts who have the expertise to
develop, implement, and maintain cybersecurity management systems.61 Demand
will continue to be high for information security analysts who create innovative
solutions to prevent hackers from stealing information or interfering with computer
networks.62 Employment of information security analysts is projected to grow 18
percent from 2014 to 2024, much faster than the average for all occupations.63
Information security analysts are employed by large, not small, organizations.64
Most small firms lack funds or personnel to dedicate to cybersecurity.65
Establishing a secure cyber environment is difficult for small businesses because of
the financial burden of implementing security techniques and the inadequate
technology skills of their employees.66 The typical owner focuses on the product or
service that the business provides and does not have extra time or money for
cybersecurity challenges, even if a breach could mean the death of the business.67
A variety of compliance laws and regulations address cybersecurity protection
and large corporations employ dedicated experts to address these obligations.68 The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) of 2002 requires publicly-traded firms to report
material deficiencies in financial reporting processes.69 While information security is
not specifically discussed, modern financial reporting systems are heavily dependent
on technology and associated controls.70 Sections 302 and 404 indirectly force
scrutiny of information security controls.71 A review of internal controls must
60. Introduction to Cybersecurity, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/content/ introductioncybersecurity (last visited Feb. 24, 2018).
61. How to Become an Information Security Analyst, NEW HORIZONS COMPUTER LEARNING CTR., https://
www.omahanh.com/solutions/career-solutions/information-security-analyst (last visited Feb. 24, 2018).
62. Information Security Analysts, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., OFF. OF OCCUPATIONAL STAT. & EMP.
PROJECTION, https://www.bls.gov/ooh/computer-and-information-technology/information-securityanalysts.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2018).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Daniel Clapper & William Richmond, Small Business Compliance with PCI DSS, 19.1 J. MGMT. INFO. &
DECISION SCI. 54, 55 (2016).
66. Id.
67. Rob Marvin, 10 Cybersecurity Steps Your Small Business Should Take Right Now, PC MAG. (May 2,
2016, 4:37 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article/344181/10-cybersecurity-steps-your-small-business-shouldtake-righ.
68. See infra notes 69–80.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(2)(A)(iii)(III) (2012).
70. An Overview of Sarbanes-Oxley for the Information Security Professional, SANS INST. (2004),
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/legal/overview-sarbanes-oxley-information-security professional-1426.
71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241, 7262 (2012).
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address information security.72 An insecure system would not be considered a source
of reliable financial information because of the possibility of unauthorized
transactions or data manipulation.73 A corporation may also need to address privacy
protection laws including the HIPPA.74 The Federal Trade Commission can issue
fines and require external auditing for several years for companies that fail to protect
private information.75 Large organizations typically employ a chief security officer or
chief information security officer who has formal training as an information security
analyst to address legal and compliance issues.76
Businesses may also choose to follow standards in order to participate in
various business arrangements. For example, the Payment Card Industry–Data
Security Standards (“PCI-DSS”) includes 12 general requirements for secure
processes for firms that accept credit card payment.77 Although not covered by SOX,
privately held businesses, even small businesses are required to comply with privacy
protection laws and must comply with PCI-DSS if they choose to accept credit
cards.78 However, employees of the small businesses do not have information security
analyst expertise.79 Most small business owners value technology and recognize its
importance to the growth of their businesses, but are concerned about their own lack
of knowledge and the unaffordability of technology resources.80 Over 40 percent of
small businesses report being ill-prepared to establish cybersecurity.81
An organization’s IT infrastructure includes all of the hardware devices,
operating systems, application code, network resources, procedures, and personnel

72. CELIA PAULSON & PATRICIA TOTH, SMALL BUSINESS INFORMATION SECURITY: THE FUNDAMENTALS 1
(Nov. 2016), https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.7621r1.
73. An Overview of Sarbanes-Oxley for the Information Security Professional, SANS INST. (2004), https://
www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/legal/overview-sarbanes-oxley-information-security-professional1426.
74. Leuan Jolly, Data Protection in the United States: Overview, THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. L. (July 1, 2017),
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/6-502-0467?transitionType=Default&bhcp=1&contextData=(sc.
Default)&firstPage=true.
75. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE: 2016 3 (Jan. 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/
reports/privacy-data-security-update-2016.
76. Nader Mehravari & Julia Allen, Structuring the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), SOFTWARE
ENG’G INST. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY (Feb. 22, 2016), https://insights.sei.cmu.edu/sei_blog/2016/02/
structuring-the-chief-information-security-officer-ciso-organization.html.
77. PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, PCI DSS QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE 8 (2010), https://www.pci
securitystandards.org/documents/PCI%20SSC%20Quick%20Reference%20Guide.pdf.
78. Id.
79. Sarah Shemkus, Growing Skills Gap: 80% of Small Businesses Can’t Find Qualified Staff, GUARDIAN
(June 22, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/jun/22/skills-gap-small-businessqualified-staff.
80. Michael Chmura, The State of Small Business in America 2016, BABSON (June 7, 2016), http://www.
babson.edu/news-events/babson-news/Pages/2016-state-of-small-business-in-america-report.aspx.
81. Id.
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necessary to operate its computer systems.82 These multiple physical, logical, and
human components are uniquely integrated to support business processes.83 Since
cybersecurity vulnerabilities can be found anywhere--in the network, hosts, access
points, application code, and user procedures--a comprehensive plan is necessary to
secure the data as it travels through the IT architecture to its final destination.84
Regardless of their size, businesses need to protect their technology infrastructure
from unauthorized, malicious events.85 Comprehensive security closes all routes of
attack found in the network, hosts, access points, application code, and user
procedures. Governance frameworks like COBIT (“Control Objectives for
Information and Related Technologies”) provide guidelines and directions for
establishing centralized security management that considers border and internal site
management, control of remote connections, and inter-organizational systems with
other firms.86
Security professionals recommend that a business adopt a defense-in-depth
approach which protects resources with several safeguards.87 An attacker must
breach all countermeasures in the series to succeed.88 Implementing security policy
with a defense-in-depth approach is complex and demands unique skills and
knowledge for risk mitigation and incident response.89 An important component of
the technology infrastructure is accessing the Internet.90 This raises multiple security
issues.91 A business could elect to have a permanent connection to the Internet and

82. DAVID T. BOURGEOIS, INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR BUSINESS AND BEYOND Ch. 1.1 (Pressbooks, 2014)
(ebook).
83. IT Infrastructure, TECHNOPEDIA https://www.techopedia.com/definition/29199/it-infrastructure (last
visited Feb. 15, 2018).
84. See CATHERINE PAQUET, IMPLEMENTING CISCO IOS NETWORK SECURITY (IINS 640-554) FOUNDATION
LEARNING GUIDE (Cisco Press, 2d ed. 2013) (ebook) (“Therefore, detective controls are aslo part of a
comprehensive security program because they enable you to detect a security breach and to determine how the
network was breached.”).
85. Chmura, supra note 80.
86. See generally ISACA, IS STANDARDS, GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES FOR AUDITING AND CONTROL
PROFESSIONALS (Jan. 15, 2009), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/files/documents/ cyber/ISACA%20%20IS%20Standards,%20Guidelines,%20and%20Procedures%20for%20Auditing %20and%20Control%20
Professionals.pdf.
87. Chad Perrin, Understanding layered security and defense in depth, TECH REPUBLIC (Dec. 18, 2008, 6:05
AM) https://www.techrepublic.com/blog/it-security/understanding-layered-security-and-defense-in-depth/.
88. Id.
89. Lance Hayden, Security is More than a Process…It’s a proficiency, CSO ONLINE (Dec. 11, 2015, 9:22
AM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/3013714/security/security-is-more-than-a-process-its-a-proficiency.
html.
90. IT Infrastructure, TECHOPEDIA https://www.techopedia.com/definition/29199/it-infrastructure (last
visited Feb. 15, 2018).
91. Wired Staff, The Biggest Security Threats Coming in 2017, WIRED (Jan. 2, 2017, 7:00 AM)
https://www.wired.com/2017/01/biggest-security-threats-coming-2017/; see generally Top 10 Threats to
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privately allocate internal IP addresses92 to computer devices. Special routers can be
established to include mapping information so that outsiders are not able to
determine the address of key employee equipment.93 Businesses that elect to connect
to the Internet through an Internet Service Provider are allocated IP addresses.94 In
this case, the IP address associated with the routers and employee devices is accessible
to the Internet.95
Secure management of access control should include two factor authentication
and management of an access control list.96 Two factor authentication requires the
purchase and distribution of special equipment--like secure ID cards--to all
employees.97 It also includes the assignment of unique usernames and passwords for
each employee.98 The access control list provides the appropriate levels of security
access to the many systems and file directories in an organization.99 This complex
process requires at least one, and often several, IT professionals to manage access to
company technology resources.100 A business may opt for a more economical option.
Access control may use single factor authentication that includes the assignment of
a unique username and password to each employee and does not implement access
control list management.101

Information Security, GEORGETOWN UNIV., https://scsonline.georgetown.edu/programs/ masters-technologymanagement/resources/top-threats-to-information-technology (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
92. An IP address (abbreviation of Internet Protocol address) is an identifier assigned to each computer
and other device (e.g., printer, router, mobile device, etc.) to connect to the Internet. The address is used to
locate and identify the device in communications with other devices on the Internet. See Stephanie Crawford &
Howstuffworks.com, What is an IP Address, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Jan. 12, 2001), https://computer.howstuff
works.com/internet/basics/question549.htm.
93. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY INDUS. CONTROL SYS. CYBER EMERGENCY RESPONSE TEAM,
RECOMMENDED PRACTICE: IMPROVING INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBERSECURITY WITH DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH
STRATEGIES 10, 36, 41, 43 (Sept. 2016), https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/recommended_practices/
NCCIC_ICS-CERT_ Defense_in_Depth_2016_S508C.pdf.
94. About Static IP addresses, AT&T https://www.att.com/esupport/article.html#!/u-verse-high-speedinternet/KM1002300 (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
95. Id.
96. 2FA / Two Factor Authentication – How it Works in Access Control, KISI, https://www.getkisi.com/
technologies/2fa-access-control (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
97. Id.; see also Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) Solutions, GEMALTO, https://safenet.gemalto. com/multifactor-authentication/two-factor-authentication-2fa/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
98. Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) Solutions, supra note 97; see also 2FA / Two Factor Authentication –
How it Works in Access Control, supra note 96.
99. Matthew Schartz, Access Control: 10 Best Practices, ENTER. SYS. J. (Mar. 27, 2007), https://esj.com/
articles/2007/03/27/access-control-10-best-practices.aspx.
100. Id.
101. Margaret Rouse, Single-factor Authentication, TECHTARGET (Mar. 2, 2017), http://searchsecurity.
techtarget.com/definition/single-factor-authentication-SFA.
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Several intrusion detection systems are available that look for anomalies in
network traffic and alert information security professionals to possible breaches.102
These tools automatically record network activities then feed data into analytics
software for analysis.103 The data analytics software provides reports of anomalies in
network traffic for investigation by the security professional.104 A business can
discover an intrusion early and possibly mitigate the damage.105 This type of
protection is only common in large businesses.106
Recognizing the cybersecurity risk to both their financial prospects and
company brands, large businesses invest in security governance frameworks and
employ professionally trained individuals to establish an IT infrastructure that can
withstand increasingly complex cyber threats.107 Small businesses have neither the
economic resources nor the in-house expertise to establish a secure cybersecurity
infrastructure.108 Small businesses have less robust security in every aspect of the IT
architecture.109 As a result, cybercriminals often target small businesses because their
information technology infrastructure is easier to penetrate.110
II. THEORIES OF LIABILITY

Businesses targeted by third-party hackers have found themselves in litigation with
their customers and state regulators.111 Although the cybercriminal caused the
damage, the business is alleged to be responsible for failing to prevent it.112 Plaintiffs
with compromised data have been testing a variety of legal theories around the
country with some success.113 Some courts have been reluctant to impose liability,

102. Tony Bradley, Introduction to Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), LIFEWIRE (Aug. 13, 2017), https://
www.lifewire.com/introduction-to-intrusion-detection-systems-ids-2486799.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Targeted Cyber Intrusion Detection and Mitigation Strategies, INDUS. CONTROL SYS. CYBER EMERGENCY
RESPONSE TEAM (Feb. 6, 2013), https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/tips/ICS-TIP-12-146-01B.
106. Cost and Value of Cyber Security, FIREEYE https://www.fireeye.com/current-threats/tco.html (last
visited on Feb. 13, 2018).
107. James Kaplan, Shantnu Sharma & Allen Weinberg, Meeting the Cybersecurity Challenge, MCKINSEY &
COMPANY (June 2011), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/ our-insights/meetingthe-cybersecurity-challenge.
108. Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar, The Need for Greater Focus on the Cybersecurity Challenges Facing
Small and Midsize Businesses, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.sec. gov/news/
statement/cybersecurity-challenges-for-small-midsize-businesses.html.
109. Id.
110. Donlon, supra note 44.
111. See infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C.
112. See infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C.
113. See infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C..
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but a data breach leaves a business owner legally vulnerable.114 Plaintiffs able to clear
the hurdle of standing have had a number of theories of liability accepted in one or
more jurisdictions.115
A. Standing
The first line of defense against a breach-victims suit has been Article III standing.
Business owners argue that the plaintiffs have not sustained “an invasion of a legally
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”116 This argument does not go far when
stolen data has already been misused.117 When no misuse has yet followed the theft,
however, plaintiffs have had difficulty convincing some courts they have sufficient
injury to support standing.118
If a fraudulent occurrence closely follows a hacking event, most courts agree
that the defrauded plaintiff has standing.119 A common scenario is stolen credit card
information resulting in “unlawful charges, restricted or blocked access to bank
accounts, inability to pay other bills, and late payment charges or new card fees.”120
Another recurring example is when the hacker or an accomplice files a false tax
return using stolen personal information to obtain a fraudulent refund.121
The real disagreement is whether plaintiffs whose information was hacked have
standing when the data has not yet been put to dishonest use.122 Some courts say the
increased risk alone of identity theft and harm is sufficient injury for standing

114.

See infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C.
See infra Parts II.A, II.B, II.C.
116. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
117. Id. at 559.
118. Id. at 563–64 (discussing the lack of an “imminent” injury or who hasn’t been “directly” affected yet is
not sufficient for standing).
119. Hapka v. CareCentrix, Inc., No. 16-2372, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175346, at *5–7 (D. Kan. Dec. 19,
2016) (finding that allegations of future harm must be taken in light of tax fraud that already happened); In re
Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 15-CV222-KOB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123030, at *40–41 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 12,
2016); Smith v. Triad of Alabama, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-324-WKW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130935, at *3–4 (M.D.
Ala. Sept. 29, 2015); In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1158–59 (D.
Minn. 2014); Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 876–77 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
120. In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1159 (D. Minn. 2014).
121. Brush v. Miami Beach Healthcare Grp., Ltd., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2017); Hapka v.
CareCentrix, Inc., No. 16-2372-CM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175346, at *5–7 (D. Kan. Dec. 19, 2016); Welborn v.
IRS, 218 F. Supp. 3d 64, 77 (D.D.C 2016); In re Anthem Data Breach Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 953, 987 (N.D. Cal.
2016); Burrows v. Purchasing Power, LLC, No. 1:12-CV-22800-UU, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186556, at *8–9 (S.D.
Fla. Oct. 18, 2012).
122. See Strautins, 27 F. Supp. 3d at 878 (showing the disagreement between courts on whether there is
standing when information has been hacked but an injury has not occurred yet).
115.
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purposes.123 Others hold that as long as one plaintiff was defrauded, then other
victims of the same hack have sufficient reason to fear imminent harm.124 A third
group rejects increased risk of harm as too speculative.125
Since a number of courts have declined to recognize standing based on fear of
increased risk of harm, plaintiffs have attempted a number of other creative theories
of economic harm. The stress and time associated with canceling and replacing credit
cards with the attendant loss in productivity have been accepted to confer standing.126
Other types of damages gaining acceptance include benefit of the bargain damages,
loss of value of personal information, consequential out-of-pocket damages,127 unjust
enrichment (based on the failure to use payments to protect data in accordance with
a privacy notice128 or on a would-not-have-patronized the business theory),129 and
overpayment for a product that did not include the reasonable security the company
represented it would provide.130 The overpayment theory—that the price plaintiffs
paid for the product or service was supposed to, but did not, include protection of
their data—has met skepticism in retail store cases because customers who paid cash
and provided no personal information paid the same price as the credit card
123. “[I]t is plausible to infer that the plaintiffs have shown a substantial risk of harm from the Neiman
Marcus data breach. Why else would hackers break into a store’s database and steal customers’ private
information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume
those consumers’ identities.” Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015). See also
Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2016); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d
1139, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2010); Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007).
124. Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96588, at *17 (N.D. Ill. July 14,
2014).
125. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44–46 (3d Cir. 2011); Fero v. Excellus Health Plan, Inc., 236 F.
Supp. 3d 735, 753 (W.D.N.Y. 2017); In re Cmty. Health Sys., No. 15-CV-222-KOB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
123030, at *34–38 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 12, 2016); Duqum v. Scottrade, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-1537-SPM, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 89992, at *10–22 (E.D. Mo. July 12, 2016); Torres v. Wendy’s Co., 195 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1283 –84 (M.D.
Fla. 2016); Khan v. Children’s Nat’l Health Sys., 188 F. Supp. 3d 524, 531 (D. Md. 2016); Alonso v. Blue Sky
Resorts, LLC, 179 F. Supp. 3d 857, 863–65 (S.D. Ind. 2016) (holding that no “concrete, particularized injury” or
“future injury…certainly impending;” “cannot manufacture standing by incurring costs in anticipation of a
non-imminent harm”); In re Sci. Applications Int’l Corp. (SAIC) Backup Tape Data Theft Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d
14, 25–26 (D.D.C. 2014).
126. Dugas v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00014-GPC-BLM, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 152838, at *18–20 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016).
127. In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., No. 15-MD-02617-LHK, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70594, at *123
(N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016). See In re Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 198 F. Supp. 3d 1183,
1204 (D. Or. 2016).
128. Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1328 (11th Cir. 2012); Weinberg v. Advanced Data Processing,
Inc. 147 F. Supp. 3d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2015). See In re Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 198 F.
Supp. 3d at 1204.
129. See In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1178 (D. Minn. 2014); In
re Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 198 F. Supp. 3d at 1204.
130. In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1224 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see In re Premera Blue
Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 198 F. Supp. 3d at 1204.
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customers.131 A loss of privacy or breach of confidentiality, unaccompanied by
economic harm, was considered insufficient to confer standing in a case involving
personal identification information.132
B. Contract and Related Claims
Courts fearing unlimited liability have been more receptive to claims sounding in
contract.133 The benefit of contract and related claims is that they require privity.134 If
a business owner promised to protect customer data, why should the courts hesitate
to enforce the bargain?
1. Breach of Written Contract
Cases involving written contracts generally seek to incorporate a privacy policy or
other document relating to data security into the written agreement.135 When a
description of privacy obligations is one of the clauses of the agreement or is
physically attached to the contract, it will be enforced as part of the contract.136 More
commonly, the question is whether contracts incorporate separate privacy notices
and policies by reference.137 Assuming there is a contractual duty, the plaintiff must

131. Fero v. Excellus Health Plain, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 735, 754 (W.D.N.Y. 2017), rev’d in part on
reconsideration sub nom. No. 6:15-CV-06569 EAW, 2018 WL 507320 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2018); In re Cmty.
Health Sys., No. 15-CV-222-KOB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123030, at *27–31 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 12, 2016); Duqum
v. Scottrade, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-1537-SPM, 2016 WL 3683001, at *6 (E.D. Mo. July 12, 2016), aff’d sub nom.
Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2017); Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 855, 861 (D.
Minn. 2015), aff’d on other grounds, 833 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2016).
132. Duqum, 2016 WL 3683001, at *8.
133. See, e.g., Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 2017).
134. Id.
135. In re Cmty. Health Sys., No. 15-CV-222-KOB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123030, at *75–80 (N.D. Ala.
Sept. 12, 2016); In re Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 198 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1197–98 (D.
Or. 2016) (dismissing contract claim with leave to replead to allege privacy notices and policies were
incorporated by reference into health benefits contracts).
136. In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., No. 15-MD-02617-LHK, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70594, at *151–
55 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016). Absent a contract between the plaintiff and defendant, courts have been reluctant
to attach liability based on a third-party beneficiary theory. Id.; In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer
Data Sec. Breach Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 566, 577–81 (S.D. Tex. 2011), rev’d in part sub nom. Lone Star Nat.
Bank, N.A. v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 729 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs must show they were
intended third-party beneficiaries. Id.; Cmty. Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Mkts., No. 15-cv-01125-MJR, 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66014, at *15–16 (S.D. Ill. May 1, 2017); Fero v. Excellus Health Plain, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d
735, 767–69 (W.D.N.Y. 2017), rev’d in part on reconsideration sub nom. No. 6:15-CV-06569 EAW, 2018 WL
507320 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2018).
137. Fero, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 760–61; In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70594, at *109–
22.
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also demonstrate how the defendant breached it, which generally takes the form of
failing to implement reasonable security measures.138
2. Implied contract
Some courts have sustained a claim that an implied contract exists obligating the
defendant to protect the personal information of the plaintiff.139 An implied contract
requires a direct contractual relationship between plaintiff and defendant.140 Courts
may not find a contract implied when there is no offer and acceptance141 or
ascertainable intent to enter into a contract.142 Like express contracts, implied
contracts require consideration in both directions.143 For a claim to survive, there
must also be actual economic damage, at least where the theft involves identity
information.144

138. In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1177 (D. Minn. 2014) (holding that in a
contract requiring defendant to “use security measures that comply with federal law,” plaintiffs failed to allege
what law defendant violated).
139. Compare Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 675 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (“Through privacy policies,
codes of conduct, company security practices, and other conduct, implicitly promised to safeguard [personal
information] in exchange for [plaintiff’s] employment . . . Plaintiff has fairly alleged the existence of an
agreement between the parties that included a covenant by the Coke Defendants to protect Plaintiff’s [personal
information], which Plaintiff alleges that the Coke Defendants breached.”), with Longenecker-Wells v.
Benecard Servs. Inc, 658 F. App’x 659, 662 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Plaintiffs have failed to plead any facts supporting
their contention that an implied contract arose between the parties other than that Benecard required Plaintiffs’
personal information as a prerequisite to employment. This requirement alone did not create a contractual
promise to safeguard that information, especially from third party hackers.”). Breach of implied warranty
claims have been less common. In the Sony Gaming Networks litigation, common law breach of implied
warranty claims were dismissed because the written contract disclaimed implied warranties. In re Sony Gaming
Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 980–84 (S.D. Cal. 2014), order corrected,
No. 11MD2258 AJB (MDD), 2014 WL 12603117 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2014). Statutory implied warranty claims in
the same litigation were dismissed because the services provided were not “goods” under the Uniform
Commercial Code. Id.
140. In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 566, 582–83 (S.D.
Tex. 2011), rev’d in part sub nom. Lone Star Nat. Bank, N.A. v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 729 F.3d 421 (5th
Cir. 2013).
141. Cmty. Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Mkts., No. 15-cv-01125-MJR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66014, at *13
(S.D. Ill. May 1, 2017).
142. Dittman v. UPMC, 154 A.3d 318, 325–26, (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017), appeal granted, 170 A.3d 1042 (Pa.
2017).
143. Dittman, 154 A.3d at 326.
144. Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96588, at *20–21 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 14,
2014).
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3. Unjust Enrichment
Unjust enrichment is another claim that has been successfully asserted.145 This has
been explained in several ways, but the most common are the overpayment and
would-not-have-shopped theories.146 The overpayment argument is that plaintiff
paid a price that included steps to guard personal information.147 The problem in the
retail store setting, like for the overpayment theory in the standing cases, is that credit
card customers pay the same price as cash customers who provide no personal data
to the store.148 The argument that fared better in the Target litigation was that the
store was unjustly enriched because customers would not have shopped at the store
had they known about poor data security.149
C. Negligence
Negligence seems like a natural fit. What all data security plaintiffs are essentially
alleging is: “If only the defendant business had taken reasonable security measures,
the hacker-thief would have been unable to obtain our personal identification
information and we would not have been injured.” Some courts have permitted such
claims.150 A negligence claim, of course, requires (1) duty; (2) breach of duty; (3)
causation; and (4) injury.151 Courts reluctant to impose tort duties in new situations

145. Fero v. Excellus Health Plain, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 735, 769–70 (W.D.N.Y. 2017), rev’d in part on
reconsideration sub nom. No. 6:15-CV-06569 EAW, 2018 WL 507320 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2018); Cmty. Bank of
Trenton v. Schnuck Mkts., No. 15-cv-01125-MJR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66014, at *22 (S.D. Ill. May 1, 2017); In
re Cmty. Health Sys., No. 15-CV-222-KOB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123030, at *81–82 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 12, 2016);
In re Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 198 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1200–01 (D. Or. 2016);
Weinberg v. Advanced Data Processing, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1368–69 (S.D. Fla. 2015); In re Target Corp.
Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1177–78 (D. Minn. 2014). But see Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 112 F.
Supp. 3d 855, 864–65 (D. Minn. 2015), aff’d on other grounds, 833 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2016); In re Sony Gaming
Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 984–85 (S.D. Cal. 2014), order corrected,
No. 11MD2258 AJB (MDD), 2014 WL 12603117 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2014).
146. See, e.g., In re Target Corp., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1178 (“This theory contends that, had Target notified its
customers about the data breach in a timely manner, Plaintiffs would not have shopped at Target and thus any
money Plaintiffs spent at Target after Target knew or should have known about the breach is money to which
Target is not entitled.”).
147. Id. (“Target charges all shoppers the same price for the goods they buy whether the customer pays with
a credit card, debit card, or cash.”).
148. Id. at 1177–78; Cmty. Bank of Trenton, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66014, at *22.
149. In re Target Corp., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1177–78.
150. In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 309 F.R.D. 482, 487–88 (D. Minn. 2015) (holding
classwide proof established elements of prima facie case of negligence).
151. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Norfolk S. Corp., 706 F.3d 170, 189 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The well-worn elements of
common-law negligence are, of course, duty, breach, causation, and damages.”); Wright v. House of Imports,
Inc., 381 S.W.3d 209, 213 (Ky. 2012); Brown v. Brown, 739 N.W.2d 313, 316–17 (Mich. 2007).
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reject an expansion into the data breach area based on a variety of failures to meet
these elements.152
1. Duty
Courts recognizing a duty to protect personal identification information from cyber
thieves reason that because “harm was foreseeable, defendant had the duty to exercise
reasonable care to prevent that harm.”153 According to a federal district court in
California, such a duty was supported by both state law and “common sense.”154
Imposing a duty was ruled appropriate pursuant to the “undertaker’s doctrine”—
defendant voluntarily agreed to provide services and take the confidential
information; therefore, defendant assumed a duty to act carefully and not put
plaintiff at risk of harm.155 One court even said, despite a growing list of authorities
to the contrary,156 that it is “well established that entities that collect sensitive, private
data from consumers and store that data on their networks have a duty to protect
that information…”157
Other courts are hesitant to impose liability for the criminal act of an unknown
third party. They say that state legislatures could have permitted private negligence
actions when they passed data breach notification laws, but since they did not, they
made an affirmative election not to impose such a duty.158 Courts worry about the
152.
153.

See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 636–37 (7th Cir. 2007).
Hapka v. CareCentrix, Inc., No. 16-2372-CM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175346, at *13 (D. Kan. Dec. 19,

2016).
154. “Although neither party provided the Court with case law to support or reject the existence of a legal
duty to safeguard a consumer’s confidential information entrusted to a commercial entity, the Court finds the
legal duty well supported by both common sense and California and Massachusetts law. . . As a result, because
Plaintiffs allege that they provided their Personal Information to Sony as part of a commercial transaction, and
that Sony failed to employ reasonable security measures to protect their Personal Information, including the
utilization of industry-standard encryption, the Court finds Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a legal duty and a
corresponding breach.” In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942,
966 (S.D. Cal. 2014), order corrected, No. 11MD2258 AJB (MDD), 2014 WL 12603117 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2014).
155. Weinberg v. Advanced Data Processing, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 2015).
156. Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 636–37 (7th Cir. 2007); Cmty. Bank of Trenton v.
Schnuck Mkts., No. 15-cv-01125-MJR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66014, at *6–7 (S.D. Ill. May 1, 2017); In re
Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 953, 975–976 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Amburgy v. Express Scripts,
Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1054 (E.D. Mo. 2009); Dittman v. UPMC, 154 A.3d 318, 323–24, (Pa. Super. Ct.
2017), appeal granted, 170 A.3d 1042 (Pa. 2017); Steven L. Caponi, Data Breach Negligence Claims Not
Recognized in Pennsylvania, 27 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L. J. 22, 23 (2015). See Alonso v. Blue Sky Resorts, LLC,
179 F. Supp. 3d 857, 865–66 (S.D. Ind. 2016), appeal dismissed sub nom. (May 16, 2016).
157. Brush v. Miami Beach Healthcare Grp. Ltd., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2017).
158. Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 636–37 (denying class certification where plaintiffs sought to hold banking
institution liable for a third-party hacking breach of their personal information because there was no injury
present); Cmty. Bank of Trenton, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66014, at *15–16; Anthem Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d at 975–
76; Amburgy, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 1054; Dittman, 154 A.3d at 323–24; Caponi, supra note 156, at 23 (2015). See
Blue Sky Resorts, 179 F. Supp. 3d at 865–66.
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limits of a duty of care imposed on a defendant not directly related to a plaintiff.159
Nor do they want to upset an allocation of liability agreed upon by the parties in a
contract.160 In Pennsylvania, courts raised public policy concerns about jurors
deciding what was reasonable care in the data security context161 and the legal system
interfering with employers electronically storing information.162
2. Breach of duty
How to allege the breach of duty is another area of contention.163 For some courts,
the cyber invasion is enough on its own.164 An intermediate position is that a bare
allegation that “defendant breached its duty to implement adequate cybersecurity
precautions” is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.165 The most stringent rule is
that it is not enough to highlight deficiencies in a cybersecurity system; plaintiffs have
to show how the system failed to meet the applicable standard of care.166
159. Willingham v. Glob. Payments, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-01157-RWS-JFK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27764, at
*61 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2013).
160. Digital Fed. Credit Union v. Hannaford Bros. Co., No. BCD-CV-10-4, 2012 Me. Bus. & Consumer
LEXIS 22, at *6–10 (Me. Bus. & Consumer Ct. Mar. 14, 2012). “‘New Jersey courts have consistently held that
contract law is better suited to resolve disputes where a plaintiff alleges direct and consequential losses that were
within the contemplation of sophisticated business entities that could have been the subject of their
negotiations.’. . . The New Jersey cases repeatedly emphasize that respecting the parties’ voluntary agreements
to allocate risk best serves the public interest.” In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach
Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 566, 582–83 (S.D. Tex. 2011), rev’d in part sub nom. Lone Star Nat. Bank, N.A. v.
Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 729 F.3d 421 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
161. Dittman v. UPMC, No. GD-14-003285, 2015 WL 4945713, at *6 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. May 28, 2015). The
court “recognized that there is an absence of guidance as to what actions constitute reasonable care and
allowing juries to determine what constitutes reasonable care is not a ‘viable method for resolving the difficult
issue of the minimum requirements of care that should be imposed in data breach litigation.’” Caponi, supra
note 156, at 23.
162. Dittman, 154 A.3d at 323–24 (declining to impose duty of reasonable care in collecting and storing
employee information). “Employers . . . have an obvious need to collect and store personal information about
their employees. . . While a data breach (and its ensuing harm) is generally foreseeable, we do not believe that
this possibility outweighs the social utility of electronically storing employee information. In the modern era,
more and more information is stored electronically and the days of keeping documents in file cabinets are long
gone. Without doubt, employees and consumers alike derive substantial benefits from efficiencies resulting
from the transfer and storage of electronic data. Although breaches of electronically stored data are a potential
risk, this generalized risk does not outweigh the social utility of maintaining electronically stored information.
We note here that [plaintiffs] do not allege that [defendant] encountered a specific threat of intrusion into its
computer systems.” Id.
163. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cybercrime, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1553, 1587–90 (2005).
164. Smith v. Triad of Ala., LLC, No. 1:14-CV-324-WKW, 2017 WL 1044692, at *12 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 17,
2017).
165. Hapka v. CareCentrix, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-02372, 2016 WL 7336407, at *5 (D. Kan. Dec. 19, 2016).
166. Silverpop Sys., Inc. v. Leading Mkt. Tech., Inc., No. 1:12-cv-2513-SCJ, 2014 WL 11164763, at *3 (N.D.
Ga. Feb. 18, 2014).
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3. Causation
Businesses have questioned the causal relationship between the breach of duty and
injury.167 How can the plaintiff prove that this data breach was the one that caused
the harm? The data may have been exposed somewhere else as well. The usual
response is that a coincidence of time and sequence between the data breach and the
harm is insufficient alone to establish causation, but will meet the requirement when
accompanied by other factors.168 For example, identity thefts occurring ten and
fourteen months after a data breach were held to be causally related when the same
types of sensitive information hacked were later used to steal the identities.169 In
another case that held causation was established, the defendant had a serious data
breach that went uncorrected for two years, the defendant exposed information from
a plaintiff who had a practice of protecting it and had never had his identity stolen
before, and data of the same type was used to file a false tax return.170
4. Injury
A number of states adhere to the “economic loss doctrine” and have employed it to
dismiss negligence claims in the data breach context.171 In these states, negligence
claims alleging purely economic loss unaccompanied by a physical injury are
deficient as a matter of law.172 Absent a duty imposed by law or a special relationship
between the plaintiff and defendant, the doctrine bars negligence claims for solely

167. See Michael Hooker & Jason Pill, You’ve Been Hacked, and Now You’re Being Sued: The Developing
World of Cybersecurity Litigation, 90 FLA. B. J. 30, 36 (2016).
168. See, e.g., Hamid Salim & Stuart Madnick, Cyber Safety: A Systems Theory Approach to Managing Cyber
Security Risks – Applied to TJX Cyber Attack, CYBERSECURITY INTERDISCIPLINARY SYS. LAB. (Aug. 2016), http://
web.mit.edu/smadnick/www/wp/2016-09.pdf.
169. Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1327 (11th Cir. 2012).
170. Brush v. Miami Beach Healthcare Grp., Ltd., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1365–66 (S.D. Fla. 2017).
171. Longenecker-Wells v. Benecard Servs. Inc., 658 F. App’x 659, 661 (3d Cir. 2016). See also Silverpop
Sys., Inc. v. Leading Mkt. Tech., Inc., 641 F. App’x 849, 852–53 (11th Cir. 2016); Dugas v. Starwood Hotels
Resorts Worldwide, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00014-GPC-BLM, LEXIS 152838, at *36–37 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016); In re
Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1171–72 (D. Minn. 2014) (stating that the
economic loss doctrine bars claims under Alaska, California, Illinois, Iowa, and Massachusetts law, but claims
are not dismissed under District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, New Hampshire, New York, and Pennsylvania
law); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 966–73 (S.D. Cal.
2014) (dismissing California and Massachusetts claims); Dittman v. UPMC, 154 A.3d 318, 325 (Pa. Super.
2017); Caponi, supra note 156. But see Lone Star Nat’l Bank, N.A. v. Heartland Payment Sys., Inc., 729 F.3d 421,
426–27 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that purely economic data breach negligence claim not dismissed because
plaintiffs might be left with no other remedy “defying ‘notions of fairness, common sense and morality;’” it was
unclear whether the conduct of the defendant was covered by a contract).
172. Beware the Economic Loss Rule, COHEN AND WOLF, P.C. (Oct. 2006), http://www.cohenandwolf.com/?t
=40&an=4619&format=xml&p=3199.
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economic loss.173 Since retail data breaches generally involve fraudulent purchases or
tax returns at most, negligence claims are regularly dismissed in these states.174
D. Misrepresentation
Fraud by omission claims resemble unjust enrichment claims; if the defendant had
disclosed its actual data security measures, the plaintiffs would not have purchased
from the store.175 One federal district court recognized such a claim was possible if
the plaintiffs pled what defendant should have disclosed to avoid being misleading.176
At least one federal district court allows for negligent or innocent
misrepresentation causes of action, but such claims ordinarily meet with little
success.177 Negligent misrepresentation claims generally require the elements of
reliance and a special relationship, which courts may not find present in retail
transactions.178 In fact, in most retail transactions, there would be no communication
about data security.179 Apart from these deficiencies, misrepresentation claims may
fail for lack of a pecuniary loss.180
E. Other Common Law Claims
Plaintiffs have tried a number of other common law claims without success. Courts
have uniformly rejected invasion of privacy claims.181 The problem is that it is an
173. Dittman v. UPMC, 154 A.3d 318, 325–26, (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017), appeal granted, 170 A.3d 1042 (Pa.
2017).
174. See, e.g., In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 564 F. 3d 489, 498 (1st Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal
of negligence claim by banks against retail chain that suffered a data breach because “purely economic losses are
unrecoverable in tort and strict liability actions in the absence of personal injury or property damage.”); Cumis
Ins. Soc’y, Inc. v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 918 N.E. 2d 36, 46–7 (Mass. 2009) (affirming dismissal of
negligence claims under the Economic Loss Doctrine concluding that credit cards were “canceled by the
plaintiff credit unions for the purpose of avoiding future economic losses.”); Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale
Club, Inc., 533 F. 3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of bank’s negligence claim against retailer).
175. In re Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 198 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1194–95 (D. Or.
2016).
176. See id.
177. In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 566, 596–97 (S.D.
Tex. 2011) (permitting amendment to complaint to allege negligent misrepresentation based on failure to
correct verifiable factual statements).
178. Fero v. Excellus Health Plain, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 735, 772–74 (W.D.N.Y. 2017), rev’d in part on
reconsideration sub nom. No. 6:15-CV-06569 EAW, 2018 WL 507320 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2018).
179. In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Security Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 973–75
(S.D. Cal. 2014).
180. Id. at 975.
181. See, e.g., Dugas v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00014-GPC-BLM, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152838, at *35–36 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016) (dismissing claim because data breach was
unintentional); Burton v. MAPCO Express, Inc. 47 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1286–87 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (dismissing
claim when only negligent data breach alleged because invasion of privacy is an intentional tort); Burrows v.
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intentional tort,182 inappropriate when a defendant commercial business fails to
protect against an unknown third-party hacker.183 Bailment claims have fared no
better because data was not placed in the exclusive possession of the defendant and
there was no agreement that it would be returned.184 Breach of fiduciary duty claims
have failed as well because the parties were not in a fiduciary relationship.185
F. Statutory Claims
In addition to the panoply of common law claims, plaintiffs have asserted violations
of a variety of federal and state statutes with mixed success.186 Generally, the federal
statutes provide no private right of action, but some courts have used violations to
support negligence per se claims.187 Some state statutes impose liability for failure to
protect customer data.188
1. Federal Statutes
The two most common federal statutes plaintiffs claim are violated when their data
is compromised are the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996

Purchasing Power, LLC, No. 1:12-cv-22800-UU, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186556, at *19-21 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 18,
2012).
182. See Dugas, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152838, at *35–36 (dismissing claim because data breach was
unintentional); Burton v. MAPCO Express, Inc. 47 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1286–87 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (dismissing
claim when only negligent data breach alleged because invasion of privacy is an intentional tort); Burrows, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186556, at *19-21.
183. Galaria v. Nationwide Ins. Co. 663 F. App’x 384, 392 (6th Cir. 2016).
184. See generally Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384 (6th Cir. 2016) (dismissing a
bailment claim based on a lack of Article III standing). See also In re Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., Customer Sec.
Data Breach Litig., No. 15-CV-222-KOB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123030, at *34–38 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 12, 2016)
(dismissing claim because data not placed in exclusive possession of purported bailee); In re Target Corp.
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1177 (D. Minn. 2014) (dismissing bailment claim
because plaintiffs did not agree with defendant that defendant would return the purported bailed property to
them); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 903 F. Supp. 2d 942, 974–75 (S.D. Cal.
2012) (dismissing bailment claim because no intentional conduct by defendant; personal information was not
personal property delivered to defendant and expected to be returned; and claim was duplicative of negligence
and consumer protection claims).
185. See In re Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 198 F. Supp. 3d 1183, 1200–01 (D. Or.
2016) (dismissing claim because parties not in type of relationship historically considered fiduciary); Weinberg
v. Advanced Data Processing, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (“[M]ere receipt of confidential
information is insufficient by itself to transform an arm’s-length transaction into a fiduciary relationship.”).
186. See infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.2.
187. See infra Part II.C.1.
188. See infra Part II.C.2.
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(“HIPAA”) and the Fair Credit Reporting Act.189 Courts agree that HIPAA provides
no private right of action.190 However, some have held that the failure to adhere to its
privacy protection provisions for confidential medical information can form the
basis of a negligence or negligence per se claim.191 The Federal Trade Commission
Act, which also does not give rise to a private right of action, has been used in this
manner as well; the argument is that since the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)
considers the failure to take reasonable steps to secure data an unfair trade practice,
a cyber breach can be a statutory violation that constitutes negligence per se.192
Violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act are frequently asserted.193 The Act
specifically permits a private right of action when its provisions are not followed.194
However, courts have uniformly held that it is directed at consumer reporting
agencies and is inapplicable to a retail customer data breach.195
2. State Data Breach Notification Laws
After a series of major data breaches made the news, nearly all the states passed
breach notification laws.196 Some of these are disclosure laws alone; they simply
189. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936
(codified in Titles 18, 26, and 42 of the United States Code) (West 2018); Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No.
91-508, 84 stat. 114-2 (codified at Titles 12 U.S.C. §§ 1830–31; 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.) (West 2018).
190. Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 2010); Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1267 n.4 (10th
Cir. 2010); Webb v. Smart Document Sols., LLC, 499 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007); Arcara v. Banks, 470 F.3d
569, 570–71 (5th Cir. 2006); Warren Pearl Constr. Corp. v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 639 F. Supp. 2d 371,
377 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
191. Compare In re Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., Customer Sec. Data Breach Litig., No. 15-CV-222-KOB, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123030, at *87–94 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 12, 2016) (finding no private right of action, but HIPAA
can define the standard of care in a negligence per se action in some states and a negligence claim in others),
with Weinberg v. Advanced Data Processing, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1365-66 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (holding that
negligence claim based on HIPAA violations fails). See also Smith v. Triad of Ala., LLC, No. 1:14-CV-324WKW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38574, at *38-39 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 17, 2017).
192. In re Cmty. Health Sys., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123030, at *87–94.
193. Jennifer L. Conn & Ryan T. Bergsieker, Cybersecurity & Data Privacy: An Overview for Health Care,
Pharmaceutical, and Biotech Companies, GIBSON DUNN (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www. gibsondunn.com/cyber
security-data-privacy-an-overview-for-health-care-pharmaceutical-and-biotech-companies-2/.
194. Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 53 (2007).
195. Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 390-91 (6th Cir. 2016); In re Cmty. Health Sys.,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123030, at *48-60 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 12, 2016) (dismissing claim because defendant not
consumer reporting agency and fees collected were for healthcare services, not evaluating credit); Falkenberg v.
Alere Home Monitoring, Inc., No. 13-cv-00341-JST, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22121, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23,
2015) (holding the Fair Credit Reporting Act does not cover healthcare provider communications with insurers
about coverage); Burton v. MAPCO Express, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1286–87 (N.D. Ala. 2014); In re Sony
Gaming Networks & Customer Data Security Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 1010–12 (S.D. Cal. 2014)
(dismissing claim because defendant not a consumer reporting agency).
196. Clarity Servs., Inc. v. Barney, 698 F. Supp. 2d 1309, 1313 n.1 (M.D. Fla. 2010). As of June 2017, only
Alabama and South Dakota had no data breach notification laws. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT.
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require a business to notify customers in the event of a breach.197 Others impose an
affirmative duty to protect data.198
In more than half the states, the data breach notification laws provide that only
the state attorney general (or other state official) may bring a claim against a business
under the statute.199 Eleven states and the District of Columbia provide for a private

CONF. ST. LEGS. (Feb. 6, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ telecommunications-and-informationtechnology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx.
197. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a02 (2017).
198. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81 5(b) (West 2018) (“A business that owns, licenses, or maintains
personal information about a California resident shall implement and maintain reasonable security procedures
and practices appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect the personal information from
unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.”); Beryl A. Howell, Cyber-Security Liability:
Is it Time to Get Off the Soapbox?, 22 COMPUTER & INTERNET L. 1, 3 (2005) (“The recent California mandatory
disclosure law (SB 1386) requires companies holding computerized personal information of California
residents to take steps either to encrypt this personal information or adopt, as part of an information security
policy, notice and disclosure procedures for any computer security breaches, whether or not the breach occurs
in California. Noncompliant companies are subject to civil suits, including class actions, for damages and
injunctive remedies in California courts.”).
199. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-545 (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-101 et seq. (West 2017); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 6-1-716 (West 2018); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-701b (West 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 §
12B-101 et seq. (West 2017); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 487N-1 et seq. (West 2017); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-51104 et seq. (West 2017) (providing that state regulator can enforce notification provision); IND. CODE ANN. § 41-11-1 et seq. (West 2017) (enabling the attorney general to seek penalties for failure to comply with data
maintenance obligations); IOWA CODE § 715C.1-2 (2014); KAN. REV. STAT. § 50-7a01 et seq. (2014) (explaining
that the attorney general can enforce compliance and seek to injunction of further violations); 10 ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 1346 et seq. (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 93H § 1 et seq. (West 2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 445.63, 72 et seq. (West 2018); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-29 (West 2018) (failing to comply is unfair
trade practice; law enforced by attorney general); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-801 et seq. (West 2017) (providing
that the attorney general can seek economic damages for every affected Nebraska resident injured by violation
of statute); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.010 et seq. (West 2018) (explaining that the attorney general can seek
injunctive relief; data collector can sue hacker or person who unlawfully benefitted); 2017 H.B. 15, Chap 36 (N.
Mex.) (effective Jun. 16, 2017); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa (McKinney 2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-01 et
seq. (West 2017); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19 (West 2017) (providing that the attorney general can bring a
civil action for failure to comply with law); 24 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. § 161 et seq. (West 2014) (explaining that
the attorney general can seek actual damages or $150,000 per breach of security or series of related breaches); 73
PA. CONST. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2301 et seq. (West 2017) (describing how the attorney general has
exclusive authority to bring action under Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law for violation of
statute); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 49-2-1 et seq. (West 2012) (providing that each violation is a civil violation
carrying penalty up to $100, not more than $25,000 in the aggregate); 11 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §§
521.002, 521.053 (West 2017) (explaining that the attorney general can seek injunctive relief, civil penalties of at
least $2,000 but not more than $50,000 per violation; failure to notify raises penalties up to $100 per person per
day and up to $25,000 per breach); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-44-101, 13-44-202, 13-44-301 (West 2017)
(providing that the attorney general can seek up to $2,500 per consumer, $100,000 per related violations); 9 VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9 §§ 2430, 2435 (West 2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6 (West 2017) (describing how the
attorney general can seek civil penalties up to $150,000 per breach or related breaches); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2A-101 et seq. (West 2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-501 et seq. (West 2017) (explaining that the attorney
general may bring action to ensure compliance, recover damages, or both).
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right of action in their statutes.200 Eight states have data notification acts that are
silent about who enforces them, which leaves it to the courts to decide whether there
is a private right of action.201 A private action, even in a state that allows one, may
require an injury.202 Some states will not allow claims to move forward absent an
injury beyond a statutory violation.203
Private rights of action aside, many states impose stiff penalties on businesses
that compromise customer data.204 Some state statutes impose strict liability; if the
information is compromised, the business holding the information will be liable and
may have to pay fines as high as $1,000 per exposed record.205 A number of state data
breach statutes also require businesses to pay plaintiffs’ legal fees.206

200. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.48.010 et seq. (West 2017); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.80 et seq. (West
2018); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3851 et seq. (West 2018) (including costs of action and attorneys’ fees, but not
including dignitary damages such as pain and suffering); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 530/5, 530/10, 530/12,
530/15, 530/20, 530/25 (West 2018) (violating act constitutes unlawful business practice under Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:3071 et seq. (2017) (requiring
damages from failure to disclose breach); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3501 et seq. (West 2018) (providing
that consumers may sue under Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act; attorney general also enforces act);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.61 (West 2017) (explaining that the attorney general also enforces act); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 359-C:19 et seq. (2017) (requiring double or triple damages if intentional, plus costs of suit, plus
attorneys’ fees; attorney general also enforces act); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-61, 75-65 (West 2018)
(explaining that the attorney general also enforces act with criminal and civil penalties); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-190 (2017) (requiring damages if willful and knowing, but only actual damages if negligent; injunction to enforce
compliance, attorneys’ fees and court costs if successful; $1,000 fine for every state resident whose information
was accessible); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107 (West 2017); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.255.010 et seq. (West
2017).
201. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.171 (West 2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-910 et seq. (West 2017); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 365.732 (West 2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.1500 (2017); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1701 et seq. (West
2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163 (West 2017); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 646A.600, 646A.602, 646A.604,
646A.624, 646A.626 (West 2017); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.98 (West 2017). See Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc.
671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1055 (E.D. Mo. 2009) (holding no private right of action in Missouri); In re Target Corp.
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1166–70 (D. Minn. 2014) (dismissing claims since
statutes provided for attorney general enforcement only, but sustained for statutes with nonexclusive remedies
or statutes silent on enforcement).
202. Bella Chasse Auto. Care, Inc. v. Advanced Auto Parts, Inc., No. 08-1568, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25084,
at *4–7 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 2009).
203. In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 14-MD-2586 ADM/TNL, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2592, at * 21–22 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2016).
204. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 4-1-11-1 et seq. (West 2017); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-801 et seq. (West
2017); 24 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. § 161 et seq. (West 2014).
205. Gwendolyn A. Williamson & Mary C. Moynihan, The Liability Hole—Cybersecurity Risks and the
Apportionment of Liability, 21 INV. LAW. 1, 5 (2014). See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
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3. State Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Acts
In some states, plaintiffs have successfully alleged breaches of consumer protection
laws prohibiting deceptive and unfair trade practices.207 In New York, for example,
which does not permit private actions under its data breach notification law, a
plaintiff class avoided a motion to dismiss a claim under a provision prohibiting
“[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business or trade or commerce or
in the furnishing of any service.”208 The claim was that the defendant businesses made
“representations in their privacy policies and on their websites concerning data
security…[that] would lead a reasonable consumer to believe that the [businesses]
were providing more adequate data security than they purportedly were.”209 Claims
like these, pursuant to deceptive business practice statutes, have survived motions to
dismiss in a number of states, many of which do not permit private rights of action
under the more specific data breach notification laws.210
III. WHAT IS “REASONABLE” DATA SECURITY?

Apart from the state statutes that hold business owners strictly liable for data
breaches regardless of fault, most claims are based on the failure of owners to provide
“reasonable” data security.211 There is little case law yet on what is reasonable; many

207. In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litigation, 162 F.Supp.3d 953, 984, 987–91, 995–96 (N.D. Cal. 2016); In
re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1161–66 (D. Minn. 2014); Fero v.
Excellus Health Plan, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 735, 774–78 (W.D.N.Y. 2017), rev’d in part on reconsideration sub
nom. No. 6:15-CV-06569 EAW, 2018 WL 507320 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2018).
208. Excellus Health Plan, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 774–78; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 2018).
209. Excellus Health Plan, 236 F. Supp. 3d at 776.
210. In re Target Corp., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1161–66; In re Cmty. Health Sys. Inc. Customer Sec. Data Breach
Litig., No. 15-CV-222-KOB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123030, at *100–04 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 12, 2016); In re Sony
Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 985, 988, 990-92, 995-96, 999-1000,
1003 (S.D. Cal. 2014). See, e.g., Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.204(1)
et seq. (West 2017); New Mexico Unfair Practices Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12-2(D)(5)(7) & (14) & 57-12-3,
et seq. (West 2018); Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 73 PA. CONST. STAT.
ANN. AND CONS. STAT. ANN §§ 201-2(4)(v)(vii) & (xxi), 201-3, et seq. (West 2017). But see Cmty. Bank of
Trenton v. Schnuck Mkt. Inc., No. 15-cv-01125-MJR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66014, at *21 (S.D. Ill. 2017) (“The
Court does not find a concrete public policy that has been violated. Defendant was not explicitly advertising
data security or luring customers into the store on the premise that it practiced better data security than other
retailers, nor were issuing banks being lured into authorizing transactions on the basis that Defendant’s data
security was top notch. Though there might have been a general market expectation that any retailer would
practice prudent data security, the facts do not suggest that Defendant gamed the market to take advantage of
consumers of financial institutions on these grounds.”).
211. Phillip L. Gordon & Zoe M. Argento, “Reasonable” Data Security: The FTC’s Guideposts for Employers,
LITTLER MENDELSON P.C. (June 9, 2014), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/ publication/reasonabledata-security-ftcs-guideposts-employers.
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lawsuits have been dismissed before the courts reached the scope of the duty212 and
data breach statutes often do not define it.213
The FTC may fill this hole. The FTC has “taken the lead in setting cybersecurity
standards, developing something like a body of common law with its vast collection
of complaints, privacy guides, and consent decrees. . .”214 and has “emerged as the
leading arbiter of what constitutes reasonable data security.”215 In one case, a federal
district court refused to dismiss negligence and negligence per se claims that used the
failure to adhere to FTC standards to signal unreasonable conduct.216
The FTC has eschewed regulations about what specific steps or protections
constitute reasonable data security; rather it states that it approaches reasonableness
on a case-by-case basis considering the size of the business and the type of data.217
This caused one panel to wonder at a recent oral argument how businesses know
whether they are in compliance.218 Reasonableness is a moving target.219 Despite this
concern, the FTC has commenced over 200 breach of privacy cases.220
In the courts, a fairly general statement that the defendant failed to meet
industry standards may suffice at the pleading stage,221 but to establish a claim, the

212.

See id. But see OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.622(2) (West 2018).
201 MASS. CODE REGS. 17.01-17.05 (2012). But see OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.622(2).
214. Stuart L. Pardau & Blake Edwards, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Privacy by Design: New Legal
Frontiers in Cybersecurity, 12 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 227, 238 (2017).
215. Id. at 242.
216. In re Cmty. Health Sys. Inc., Customer Sec. Data Breach Litig., No. 15-CV-222-KOB, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 123030, at *87–94 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 12, 2016).
217. According to the FTC, “data-security cases pose questions ‘so specialized and varying in nature as to be
impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule.’ Data-security risks and standards evolve
constantly and vary based on a business’s size and the type of data it maintains. The FTC, therefore, ‘must
retain power to deal with [such] problems on a case-by-case basis if the administrative process is to be
effective.’” Brief of the FTC at 49, LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 678 F. App. 816 (11th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-16270), https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/labmd_ca11 _ftc_r esponse_brief_2017-0209.pdf (citations
omitted).
218. Jimmy H. Koo, Judges Question FTC Data Security Standard at LabMD Argument, BLOOMBERG (June
23, 2017), https://www.bna.com/judges-question-ftc-n73014460645/ (“Rulemaking isn’t effective and there are
too many variables, as standards are always changing, the FTC’s counsel said. The court, however, questioned
how companies are supposed to know ‘that they’re violating what they’re violating,’ if there are no rules.”).
219. See Patco Constr. Co. v. People’s United Bank, 684 F.3d 197, 209 (1st. Cir. 2012) (explaining that for
electronic fund transfers, UCC protects banks that employ security procedures commercially reasonable for the
particular customer and the particular bank); see also John Black, Developments in Data Security Breach
Liability, 69 BUS. LAW. 199, 205 (2013).
220. Pardau & Edwards, supra note 214, at 240.
221. Under a California statute, a complaint alleging that a business failed to “appropriately encrypt
customers’ data” and that “‘security systems and protocols’ should have been designed, implemented,
maintained, and tested ‘consistent with industry standards and requirements’” survived a motion to dismiss.
Dugas v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00014-GPC-BLM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
152838, at *31–32 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016).
213.
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plaintiff must introduce evidence of the standard, the custom within the industry.222
Custom in the industry, however, cannot provide the whole answer. Should a
physician practicing alone be held to the same standard of data security as a multistate medical conglomerate because they are in the same industry? What factors
should a court consider when determining whether a small business owner acts
reasonably with respect data security? Certainly, expense must be taken into account
when assessing what is reasonable for small business owners.223 Is it also appropriate
to bear the education of the business owner in mind?
In a variety of contexts, courts have recognized the need to treat small
businesses differently from large corporations because of the disparity in financial
resources.224 More formality is expected at a large corporation.225 For example, courts
do not expect a small business “owner to spend the time, or incur the expense, to
document individual employment decisions.”226 Small business owners are held to a
reasonable small business owner standard.227 The data security context is no
different. “Reasonable efforts may vary in light of the circumstances. What is
reasonable for a large corporation with sizable resources may not be reasonable for
an individual small business owner.”228 Requiring a small business owner to do more
can “make the cost of running a small business prohibitive.”229 The FTC has
suggested that, for economic reasons, it expects less data security from small
businesses.230
222.

Silverpop Sys., Inc. v. Leading Mkt. Tech., Inc., 641 F. App’x 849, 852 (11th Cir. 2016).
Gordon & Argento, supra note 211.
224. See, e.g., Allstar Mktg. Grp., LLC v. Your Store Online, LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1131–34 (C.D. Cal.
2009) (finding in favor of small business); Del. Credit Corp. v. Aronoff, No. 92-CV-135S, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10422, at *20-21 n.9 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding in favor of small business); Bell Atlantic Tricon Leasing Corp. v.
Johnnie’s Garbage Serv., Inc., 439 S.E.2d 221, 225–26 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (finding in favor of small business);
cf. Azari v. B&H Photo Video, No. 06 Civ. 7825 (DLC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(finding in favor of large corporation defendant). In Pludeman v. N. Leasing Sys., Inc., 74 A.D.3d 420 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2010), a large corporate defendant was required to pay to notify small business class members. Id. at
425.
225. Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1120–21 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
226. Hague v. Thompson Distrib. Co., 436 F.3d 816, 826 (7th Cir. 2006).
227. Rodrigue v. Olin Employees Credit Union, 406 F.3d 434, 451 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[Physician] could be
expected to take the reasonable steps that any small business owner would take to prevent embezzlement by an
employee.”).
228. United States v. Aruda, No. 05–00751, 2006 WL 2051336, at *3 (D. Haw. July 19, 2006).
229. Roberts v. Tiny Tim Thrifty Check, 367 So. 2d 64, 65 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
230. Brief of Respondent at 6, LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 678 F. App’x 816 (11th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-16270),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/labmd_ca11_ftc_response_brief_2017-0209.pdf (“[B]ecause
companies vary widely in size and the type and volume of data they hold, a one-size-fits-all regime would be
unworkable. Instead, the Commission has made clear that ‘[t]he touchstone of [its] approach to data security is
reasonableness: a company’s data security measures must be reasonable and appropriate in light of the
sensitivity and volume of consumer information it holds, the size and complexity of its business, and the cost of
available tools to improve security and reduce vulnerabilities.’”). A small laboratory company the FTC has
223.
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Economics aside, whether a small business owner is entitled to be treated
differently because he or she does not know any better presents a tougher question.
On the one hand, the law does not reward ignorance231 and individuals cannot rely
on their lack of sophistication to excuse a lack of diligence.232 On the other hand,
courts regularly judge the reasonableness of behavior in light of education and
experience.233 Even in large corporations with highly educated and experienced
businesspeople overseeing operations, some worry that data security issues pose
challenges because the people in charge know nothing about them and cybersecurity
risks are changing faster than the executives can learn about them.234 Data security

pursued with the tenacity of Inspector Javert may, however, doubt the sincerity of these words. Its billing
manager downloaded a file-sharing program so she could listen to music at her work station. Id. at 2. The
program allowed files in her document folder to be shared with other users, including a file with information
about 9,300 patients. Id. at 3. To market its services, a data security firm trolled the Internet looking for
openings to files and then contacted the compromised companies, hoping to convince them to purchase the
firm’s services. Id. at 11. The data security firm found the billing manager’s file and contacted the laboratory,
but the laboratory fixed the problem and refused to purchase the data security firm’s services. Id. at 11. The data
security firm reported the laboratory (and other companies who did not purchase its services) to the FTC. Id. at
11. Relying on fabricated evidence from the data security firm that four different IP addresses had downloaded
the file, the FTC issued a complaint against the laboratory alleging it did not provide reasonable security. Id. at
12. An FTC administrative law judge dismissed the case, but the full commission reversed. Even though the
laboratory went out of business because of the cost of the FTC proceedings and litigation, the FTC ordered
expensive remedial measures. Id. at 12–13. The Eleventh Circuit granted a stay and the litigation is ongoing. See
LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 678 F. App’x 816 (11th Cir. 2016).
231. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930 (2015), vacating in part, Commil USA, LLC
v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361 (E. D. Tex. 2013) (“‘[O]ur law is . . . no stranger to the possibility that an act
may be “intentional” for purposes of civil liability, even if the actor lacked actual knowledge that her conduct
violated the law.’ Tortious interference with a contract provides an apt example. While the invalidity of a
contract is a defense to tortious interference, belief in validity is irrelevant. In a similar way, a trespass ‘can be
committed despite the actor’s mistaken belief that she has a legal right to enter the property.’ And of course,
‘[t]he general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution is deeply
rooted in the American legal system.’ In the usual case, ‘I thought it was legal’ is no defense.”) (citations
omitted).
232. J. Geils Band Emp. Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76 F.3d 1245, 1260 (1st Cir. 1996)
(“Unsophisticated or not, plaintiffs cannot shroud themselves in ignorance or expect that their unsophistication
will thoroughly excuse their lack of diligence.”).
233. Forgues v. Select Portfolio Servicing, 690 F. App’x 896, 900 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Munguia,
704 F.3d 596, 604–05 (9th Cir. 2012); Bustamante v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 619 F.2d 360, 364 (5th Cir.
1980); In re General American Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 391 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 2004); Benedetto v.
PaineWebber Grp., Inc., No. 96-3401, 1998 WL 568328, at *4 (10th Cir. 1998), aff’g in part, rev’g in part, 1996
WL 665460 (D. Kan. 1996); In re McLaren, 3 F.3d 958, 962 (6th Cir. 1993); Brown v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 991
F.2d 1020, 1032 (2d Cir. 1993); Silver v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue Serv., 2008 Tax Ct. Memo WL 4862161, at
*7 (U.S. Tax Ct. Nov. 10, 2008); Key v. Cherokee Credit Life Ins. Co., 298 So.2d 892, 894 (La. Ct. App. 1974);
Seaboard Planning Corp. v. Powell, 364 So. 2d 1091, 1094 (Miss. 1978); Grewing v. Minneapolis ThreshingMachine Co., 80 N.W. 176, 178 (S.D. 1899).
234. Arthur C. Delibert et al., Cybersecurity: Could Investment Company Directors Be Liable for a Breach?,
22 INV. LAW. 1, 1 (2015) (“Cybersecurity concerns are different than the other hot issues that boards are
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issues lie like traps for small business owners who, in most cases, are untrained in
technology security235 and often have little or no college education.236
And their financial vulnerability to customers may get worse. Courts have
hinted that they may be more likely to impose liability in the future.237 Some, in
denying liability, suggest that businesses will be expected to be more savvy about data
security than they are now; in other words, the reasonableness bar will be raised.238
The entire world is moving towards electronic storage of information. With
this will come a greater awareness of what is reasonable in terms of the care
and storage of confidential information. At some point, the balance of
weighing social utility in favor of data storage entities may shift more in
favor of persons like [plaintiffs]. . . [H]arm becom[ing] foreseeable under
circumstances that commonly are understood to render storage
vulnerable…may weigh in favor of imposing additional duties upon an
actor even absent legislative action. As for. . . the overall public interest. . .,.
. . this factor too may shift as the foreseeability of harm changes with the
evolution and increased use of this technology.239
IV. POTENTIAL IMPACT ON SMALL BUSINESSES

When customer data is compromised in a small business, the potential statutory fines
or litigation damages can be devastating. State attorneys general can seek penalties of
as much as $2,500 per consumer.240 Primary care physicians, who average 2,367
confronting nowadays . . . because cybersecurity issues are matters for which board members may not have any
intuitive feel from their backgrounds in the business or regulatory worlds, because the problems in the
cybersecurity realm are mutating faster than problems in other areas, and because the problems of
cybersecurity are imposed largely from outside the organization.”).
235. See Daniel Clapper & William Richmond, Small Business Compliance with PCI DSS, 19.1 J. MGMT.
INFO. & DECISION SCI. 54, 55 (2016).
236. The Surprising Demographics of Small Business Owners, SMALLBIZLABS (June 21, 2016), http://www.
smallbizlabs.com/2016/06/the-demographics-of-small-business-owners.html.
237. See Cmty. Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., No. 15-cv-01125-MJR, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
66014, at *11 (S.D. Ill. May 1, 2017); see also id. at *11 n.3 (“In much of the other data breach litigation, standing
has been scrutinized closely. However, that issue has not been put before the Court at this juncture, so the
Court is not considering the harms stated from that perspective without the benefit of argument from the
parties.”).
238. Dittman v. UPMC, 154 A.3d 318, 327 (Pa. Super. 2017) (Stabile, J., concurring).
239. Id.
240. FIRST DATA MKT. INSIGHT, SMALL BUSINESSES: THE COST OF A DATA BREACH IS HIGHER THAN YOU
THINK (2014), https://www.firstdata.com/downloads/thought-leadership/Small_Businesses_Cost _of_a_Data_
Breach_Article.pdf (stating that data breaches can cost small businesses up to $36,000); The True Cost of a Data
Breach to a Small Business, CORP. INFO. TECHS., (2016), https:// www.corp-infotech.com/true-cost-data-breachsmall-business/ (stating that the direct out-of-pocket costs of a data breach for most small businesses is
approximately $14,000, excluding legal, regulatory, or compulsory fines and fees).
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patients,241 could easily find themselves bankrupt. A diner, serving an estimated
200,000 meals in a year,242 could be driven out of business.
The potential losses do not stop at fines. Lawsuits brought by plaintiffs with
compromised data add another layer of financial risk.243 Identity theft protection for
customers costs $25 to $60 per customer per year.244 Fees for late payments or new
cards might have to be reimbursed for anyone whose card was misused.245 Soft
damage claims like stress and lost time from canceling and replacing cards could cost
much more.246 Statutes that require businesses to pay plaintiffs’ legal fees could
involve significant expense.247
Even the cost of defending against prohibitive injunctive relief can be too great
a burden for a small business. A small medical laboratory battling against the FTC
claims it “was forced to wind down operations and stop diagnosing cancer” because
of the “crushing burdens imposed upon it by the FTC’s investigation and ensuing
action…”248 Although the Commission imposed no fine, it required the lab—already
241. Lenny Bernstein, How many patients should your doctor see each day?, WASH. POST (May 22, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2014/05/22/how-many-patients-should-yourdoctor-see-each-day/?utm_term=.93ecd0a1e2e3.
242. An estimate may be determined by considering the number of tables, the number of individual seats,
hours of operation, and the average time a patron stays in the establishment. Wilhelm Schnotz, How to
Calculate the Sales in a Restaurant and Customer Turnover, CHRON, http://small business.chron.com/calculatesales-restaurant-customer-turnover-33155.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2018). This estimate can be adjusted to
consider the frequency that the diner is not at full capacity. Id. Consider a diner with 30 tables, each seating 4
people. It is expected that half the time, only 2 customers will sit at a table, while 4 customers will sit at the
tables the other half of the time. The diner is opened 12 hours a day, 360 days a year. An average patron stays
about 2 hours in the establishment. An estimated number of customers served each day is about 540, almost
200,000 in a year.
243. See Data Breach Lawsuit, CLASSACTION (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.classaction.com/databreach/lawsuit (“When a company fails to exercise reasonable care in protecting its customers’ information,
affected consumers may be able to unite and file a class action lawsuit against the company.”).
244. Hal Bundrick, Should You Buy Identity Theft Insurance?, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 24, 2014, 9:08 AM), http://
money.usnews.com/money/blogs/my-money/2014/03/24/should-you-buy-identity-theft-insurance.
245. See In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1159 (D. Minn. 2014)
(allowing claims regarding unreimbursed fees to survive the pleading stage).
246. See Dugas v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00014-GPC-BLM, 2016
WL 6523428, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2016).
247. Daniel R. Stoller, Anthem Data Breach Class Action Hung Up Over Attorneys’ Fees, BIG LAW BUSINESS,
(Feb. 6, 2018), https://biglawbusiness.com/anthem-data-breach-class-action-hung-up-over-attorneys-fees/
(“Anthem Inc. can’t dispose of consumer class claims stemming from a 2015 data breach for now, after a federal
judge raised concerns about nearly $38 million in proposed attorneys’ fees.”).
248. Brief of Petitioner at 6, LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 678 F. App’x 816 (11th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-16270),
https://www.scribd.com/document/335250387/2016-12-27-LabMD-Appellant-Brief#from_embed. According
to the Eleventh Circuit, which granted a stay pending appeal, “LabMD ceased operations in January 2014.
LabMD says its business could not bear the costs imposed by the FTC investigation and litigation, so it had to
close. LabMD has essentially no assets, no revenue, and does not plan to resume business in the future. It
obtained counsel pro bono because it could not afford to pay a lawyer. LabMD now has no employees, and
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out of business—to adopt a “reasonably designed program” to secure patient data, to
retain a qualified professional to conduct a biannual independent assessment of the
program, and to notify 9,300 individuals that their data had been exposed.249
Many general liability insurance policies do not cover cybersecurity liability
costs; insurance companies sell separate coverage for this type of peril.250 Moreover,
coverage might be rejected even under policies that include such risks.251 If insurance
does not cover breaches of contract or statutory fines, a business has significant
exposure.
Without a legal safeguard for small businesses, the potential for loss is too great.
Indeed, in this era, where the threat of data breaches by unknown third
parties is omnipresent, regardless of what preventative measures are taken,
the potential disparity between the degree of a defendant’s fault and the
damages to be recovered could be immensely disproportionate, resulting in
drastic implications for defendants named in lawsuits as well as our
economic system at large.252
V. A NEW APPROACH FOR SMALL BUSINESSES

Given their limited resources and lack of sophistication about information
technology, it is unreasonable to expect small business owners to take independent
steps to ensure data security. Consumers want the convenience of credit card
payment and small businesses have been pushed into the cyber age whether they
want to be there or not.253 Unless they are to be driven out of business for third-party
crimes they cannot reasonably be expected to prevent, the law needs to look at the
problem in a different way for small businesses.
One improvement for breaches involving payment cards would be to impose
liability, if any, on the card issuer. Credit card companies and banks require
keeps only the records required by law in a secured room, on an unplugged computer that is not connected to
the Internet. LabMD has less than $5,000 cash on hand, and is subject to a $1 million judgment for terminating
its lease early.” LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 678 F. App’x 816, 819 (11th Cir. 2016).
249. Brief of the FTC at 14–15, LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 678 F. App’x 816 (11th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-16270),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/labmd_ca11_ftc_response_brief_2017-0209.pdf.
250. Cybersecurity, NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMM’RS, http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_cyber_risk. htm
(last updated Dec. 12, 2017).
251. Matthew L. Jacobs & Daniel A. Johnson, Pitfalls for Data Breach Coverage under Cybersecurity
Insurance Policies, LEXOLOGY (July 7, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail. aspx?g=adb8fb3e-e1744448-b208-cea387ec6080.
252. Longenecker-Wells v. Benecard Servs. Inc., No. 1:15–CV–00422, 2016 U.S. Dist. WL 5576753, at *6
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 22, 2015), aff’d, 658 F. App’x 659, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15696 (3d Cir. 2016).
253. TJ McCue, Why Don’t More Small Businesses Accept Credit Cards, FORBES (Aug. 16, 2013, 9:04
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tjmccue/2013/08/16/why-dont-more-small-businesses-accept-creditcards/#3aa5e88015b4.
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businesses that accept credit cards to comply with data security protocols; the
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards (“PCI DSS”) apply to every
merchant who accepts payment cards.254 If these standards are breached, the
businesses can suffer contractual penalties, including revocation of the right to accept
the credit card.255 In theory, these penalties apply to all businesses, large and small,
but market realities cause the practice to be different.256
Upon a data security failure, large retailers are unlikely to lose the right to accept
credit cards, even when they fail to follow PCI DSS.257 TJX Companies, Inc., for
example, owner of T.J. Maxx, Marshall’s, and Home Goods, experienced a breach of
about 100 million Visa and MasterCard accounts-–the largest ever experienced at
that time in 2005.258 The fraud-related losses involving Visa cards alone were about
$70 million.259 TJX had not complied with nine of the 12 security controls mandated
by the PCI DSS when the breach occurred.260 TJX knew before the breach that its
wireless networks were insufficiently protected, but took no steps to mitigate the
situation.261 Nevertheless, TJX did not lose its ability to accept any major payment
cards.262 Had the TJX stores been denied charging privileges, the credit card
companies would have sustained noticeable losses.

254. Mark Bernette, How to Explain PCI Compliance Penalties to Beginners, MERCHANT LINK (Nov. 10,
2014), http://www.merchantlink.com/how-explain-pci-compliance-penalties-beginners.
255. See DELL SECURE WORKS, PCI DSS COMPLIANCE FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2014), https://www.
secureworks.com/~/media/Files/US/White%20Papers/DellSecureWorksECO1210NPCIDSSFrequentlyAskedQ
uestions.ashx.
256. See generally supra Part IV (highlighting the devastation that may occur to small businesses when
statutory fines and litigation damages are incurred due to a data breach of customers’ data).
257. See Gary G. Berg et al., Analyzing the TJ Maxx Data Security Fiasco, CPA J. 34–35 (2008); see also
Payments We Accept – T.J. Maxx – TJX Companies, https://tjmaxx.tjx.com/store/jump/topic/ payments-weaccept/2400063 (last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
258. Joseph Pereira & Robin Sidel, TJX in Security-Breach Deal, Wall Street J. (Dec. 3, 2007),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119664612876511238 (“TJX Co s. has agreed to pay up to $40.9 million to
resolve potential claims by banks that lost money . . . estimated to be the largest settlement by a retailer over lost
credit-card data.”); Jon Brodkin, TJX data breach affected 94 million cards, banks allege, NETWORK WORLD (Oct.
24, 2007), https://www.networkworld.com/article/2287572/lan-wan/tjx-data-breach-affected-94-millioncards—banks-allege.html; Larry Greenemeier, Data, Theft, Pushback, and the TJX Effect – Details of the Largest
Customer Data Heist in U.S. History are Beginning to Emerge, INFO. WEEK (Aug. 13, 2007), http://siptrunking.tmcnet.com/news/2007/08/13/ 2858485.htm.
259. Brodkin, supra note 258.
260. Jaikumar Vijayan, TJX Violated Nine of 12 PCI Controls at Time of Breach, COMPUTER WORLD (Oct. 26, 2007),
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2539588/security0/tjx-violated-nine-of-12-pci-controls-at-time-ofbreach—court-filings-say.html.
261. Id.
262. See, e.g., Payments We Accept – T.J. Maxx – TJX Companies, https://tjmaxx.tjx.com/store/jump/
topic/payments-we-accept/2400063 (last visited Feb. 20, 2018).
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Small businesses are in a different bargaining position with the credit card
companies.263 Although they lack security expertise or dedicated in-house resources,
they must still comply with PCI DSS in order to accept payment cards for
purchases.264 When a small business is compromised, it may immediately be required
to hire a Qualified Security Assessor (“QSA”)265 to conduct a PCI assessment and
issue a Report on Compliance (“ROC”).266 Aside from lost customer trust, the
business faces contractual fines, detailed forensics investigation, and a loss of the
ability to accept payment cards, any of which could put it out of business.267 Since
Visa loses little by declaring an individual small business no longer worthy of
accepting its card, small businesses have sufficient incentive to comply with data
security protocols to the best of their ability.268
In light of the lack of knowledge and sophistication of small businesses and the
private penalties they already face, state legislatures should consider protecting their
small businesses from any common law liability for credit card related data security,
absent a specific contractual provision to the contrary. Using the number of owners,
the number of employees, and annual revenue, states should be able to define small
businesses that have neither: (1) the financial resources or the personnel to take on
responsibility for data security; nor (2) sufficient revenue to warrant special lenient
treatment by credit card companies.
This approach would shift the onus to credit card companies to provide
adequate data security training, updates, and inspections to small businesses because
affected consumers would turn to them in the event of a breach. Rather than
requiring every physician, hairdresser, and restaurateur to get a degree in
information technology, the burden will fall on parties with the knowledge,
experience, and resources to battle the hackers. Consider the example of the
physician’s office again, now with a focus on payment card company capabilities. The
physician’s small business has contracts with vendors such as card companies and
263. See Catherine Clifford, Rewards cards: Consumers Love’em, Retailers Don’t, CNN (July 14, 2011),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/07/14/smallbusiness/rewards_credit_cards/index.htm.
264. See DELL SECURE WORKS, PCI DSS COMPLIANCE FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2014), https://www.
secureworks.com/~/media/Files/US/White%20Papers/DellSecureWorksECO1210NPCIDSSFrequentlyAskedQ
uestions.ashx.
265. See id.
266. Id.; SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY (PCI) DATA SECURITY STANDARD REPORT ON
COMPLIANCE 1 (2016), https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI-DSS-v3_2-ROC-Reporting Template.pdf (“The . . . (ROC) is produced during onsite PCI DSS assessments as part of an entity’s validation
process. The ROC provides details about the entity’s environment and assessment methodology, and
documents the entity’s compliance status for each PCI DSS requirement.”).
267. DELL SECURE WORKS, PCI DSS COMPLIANCE FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2014), https://www.
secureworks.com/~/media/Files/US/White%20Papers/DellSecureWorksECO1210NPCIDSSFrequentlyAskedQ
uestions.ashx.
268. See Clifford, supra note 263 (suggesting that small businesses are more dependent on credit card
companies than vice versa).
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banks for card processing. While the physician and staff members are not formally
educated in information technology or cybersecurity management, the vendors are.
The vendors have the technology infrastructure and the personnel to monitor
network and system activity for anomalies. The vendors have software maintenance
procedures to upgrade network and system software with necessary patches that
repair security vulnerabilities. The vendors verify users with a multiple
authentication system. The vendors have employee training programs and bestpractice procedures to mitigate the high cybersecurity exposure from social
engineering269 and other risky behaviors.
The vendor cybersecurity management policy planning, implementation, and
maintenance can extend beyond the vendor’s own technology infrastructure to its
small business clients. A vendor’s cybersecurity preventive measures like virtual
private networks, authentication systems, and intrusion detection applications can
be packaged with the card payment systems. The vendors can also share employee
training programs with small businesses and perform periodic inspections to ensure
compliance. With this oversight, a small business can approximate the cybersecurity
management of a large business.
The law of cybersecurity liability should recognize that small businesses do not
have IT capabilities of their own. Their vendors are in a much better position to
safeguard customer data.270 Other possible improvements warrant discussion. Small
businesses could be exempted from statutory fines in states that impose penalties for
the failure to maintain “reasonable” data security.271 Such fines do not serve as an
incentive to businesses lacking the resources and background to institute security
measures they don’t know about; they can deter financially strapped small businesses
from operating at all.272 A related improvement would provide a safe harbor to small
businesses that timely report a breach to their customers. If the business informed
customers within a short time of learning about the breach, the small business would
be immune from customer suits. This would encourage quick disclosure and remove
the possibility of crushing liability.

269. In the context of cybersecurity, social engineering refers to the tactic of using deceptive means to fool
someone into providing access to confidential information.
270. See Michael Delio, Credit Card Cos. Watch Own Backs, WIRED (Feb. 27, 2003, 2:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2003/02/credit-card-cos-watch-own-backs; AVIVAH LITAN & JOHN PESCATORE, HUGE
STOLEN CREDIT CARD CASE POSES RISKS TO MANY PARTIES 2 (2003), http://www.bus.umich.edu/kresgepublic/
journals/gartner/research/113700/113712/113712.pdf; see also Doug Pollack, It’s a New Day for Payment Card
Fraud Liability, ID EXPERTS (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www2.idexpertscorp. com/knowledge-center/single/its-anew-day-for-payment-card-fraud-liability (describing the ability of the Banks and Processors to pay for the
initial litigation, and then later shifting the burden back to the businesses).
271. See supra Part III.
272. See supra Part III.
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Small businesses face enormous liability and need legal protection.273
Lawmakers should promptly address this cybersecurity liability threat with the
suggested improvements or other legal safeguards. Absent intentional misbehavior,
small business owners should not bear liability for injuries they have no hope of
preventing.
CONCLUSION

Data breaches at mega-corporations have dominated the news, but hackers often
target small businesses. Small business data can be more vulnerable because security
measures are less sophisticated and the personnel using them are technologically
unaware.
Courts and state legislatures have taken a number of approaches to liability for
compromised data. Some courts have allowed contract, implied contract, unjust
enrichment, negligence, misrepresentation, and statutory claims by customers (often
asserted in class actions), while others have been leery of imposing liability at all.
Nearly all the state legislatures have enacted data breach notification laws, some of
which provide for stiff fines per affected consumer.
The standard for both common law and statutory claims is most often
reasonableness. Did the business provide “reasonable” data security? Courts
generally take into account the financial resources of the business in determining
what is reasonable. The law should also take into account the technological expertise
and education of the small business owner.
The lack of technical sophistication of small business owners suggests that the
law should not hold them responsible for credit card data hacks. The burden should
be on the card companies to train, update, and inspect small businesses permitted to
use their cards. State legislatures should consider exempting small businesses from
liability for statutory fines and providing a safe harbor against consumer suits when
small businesses promptly notify customers of a breach. Lawmakers should address
this issue for their small businesses as soon as possible.

273. See Rob Marvin, 10 Cybersecurity Steps Your Small Business Should Take Right Now, PC MAG. (May 2,
2016), https://www.pcmag.com/article/344181/10-cybersecurity-steps-your-small-business-should-take-righ
(stating that small businesses dealing with a cybersecurity challenge might mean life or death for a small
business); , FIRST DATA MKT. INSIGHT, PAYMENT CARD DATA BREACHES: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
YOUR RISK AND LIABILITY (2014), https://www.firstdata.com/ downloads/thoughtleadership/13405_0714_
Payment_Card_Data_Breach.pdf (stating that small merchants may be held liable for tens of thousands of
dollars in fines, and identifying the liabilities the small businesses could face from various different entities).

Vol. 13 No. 2 2018

253

